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Abstract 
 
This master thesis in Sociology of Law explored the persistency of low-level 
corruption in post-communist Hungary. By adopting an anthropological approach 
20 unstructured in-depth interviews were conducted in Hungarian language. The 
main focus of the research was on how law actually works. The collected material 
suggested that inadequate legislation supports informal economic transactions 
(“bad regulation generates necessary corruption”). Therefore Ehrlich’s ‘living 
law’ and legal pluralism provided a theoretical framework. The results supported 
the idea that the phenomenon of petty corruption persisted and proliferated during 
the transition process, and kept growing despite the EU accession. Four main 
reasons were indentified for individuals taking part in informal transactions which 
fit into the 'survival tactic' literature of post-communist societies: ‘not enough 
salary’, ‘I have no choice, because the regulations are wrong’, 'I am pressured by 
my superior or the institute’, ‘just go with the flow’. The reasons behind the low 
frequency of formally reported wrong-doing were considered and it was suggested 
that citizens try to control corruption in informal ways. The lack of political will 
to implement adequate laws, and the civil social organisations never-ending fight 
to introduce legislation were presented. The research intends to contribute to the 
categorisation of petty corruption in Hungary, by establishing living law 
imperatives. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In Hungary the ‘merjtenni.hu’ legal aid homepage was started in 2010 by the 
Hungarian Chapter of Transparency International (TI). The target was to motivate 
whistleblowers
1
 and citizens who encountered corruption to speak up about their 
experiences. Because there wasn’t comprehensive legislation about reporting, and 
the current law contains many loopholes, the home page instead of giving a clear 
definition and options for whistleblowers lists several areas and cases of 
corruption. It also lists the authorities to which concerned citizen can submit 
complaints or notifications about the corrupt practices. The listed areas are health 
care, education, EU funds, labour cases, environment, public procurement, unfair 
trade, fraud, and lobbying. It is possible to submit a petition on the homepage 
requesting advice and in some cases legal aid from the TI. In spite of the fact that 
there is a test (with five simple questions) to determine whether a case is a 
corruption case or something else, during a four year period there were only a 
couple of cases which would satisfy the definition of an EU standard 
whistleblowing report according to the legal leader of the TI Hungary. 
However, another anti-corruption page (fizettem.hu) run by a partner organization 
(Atlatszo.hu) of the TI listed more than ninety reported low-level corruption cases 
during the last twelve months. On the homepage, citizens can submit how much 
bribe they paid and to whom, or indicate that they were asked for a bribe (or 
occasionally, the fact that they wanted to pay, but the other party didn’t expect the 
bribe). Usually people provide a detailed description of the corrupt situation. This 
homepage seems very popular and some of the stories have been read more than 
one thousand times according to the statistics. Here there seems to be a 
contradiction - on the one hand it seems that citizens are not interested in 
reporting corruption (from TI and Ombudsman reports), or that they do not know 
which practices are corrupt - but on the other hand they are willing to submit 
details regarding the bribery they have partaken in, and share their stories of how 
to deal with a greedy gynecologist, how much they had to pay to get a driving 
license, or how you are expected to give money to corrupt police officers.  
The example above demonstrates the existence of and the hidden nature of 
informal economic transactions and the difficulties around combating low-level 
corruption in Hungary. Indirectly it also highlights a difference in the socio-
                                                          
1
 Transparency International (TI) defines whistleblowing as the disclosure or reporting of 
wrong-doing, which includes corruption and several other areas besides. A whistleblower 
is any public or private sector employee or worker who discloses information about 
wrong-doing and who is at risk of retribution. 
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economic and cultural settings between the old and new EU member states
2
: in 
the old member states whistleblowing is an effective means to combat corruption, 
whilst in Hungary there is no protection against retaliation when someone reports 
a wrong-doing in any formal way. The existence of the informal economic 
transactions reported in Hungary (such as payments for getting a driving licence, 
thank-you-money in hospitals) shows similarities to the other Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries with a communist past (EU Anti-corruption Report 
2013). Low-level corruption cases can also be identified in Western EU
3
 
countries, especially in the police and health care sectors - but they show 
differences to those in the CEE countries in nature and scale (EU Anti-corruption 
Report 2013 - The Report). The Report recognised that the health care sector is 
the most effected by low-level corruption in Hungary. However, already in 2003 
GRECO (Group of States Against Corruption) pointed out that the ‘gratitude’ 
payments for public services (especially in the healthcare sector) are a form of 
‘accepted’ corruption (GRECO Evaluation Report, 2002). This report addresses 
an important notion - that not all corruption is perceived as negative by the citizen 
- but fails to mention all the other affected sectors and areas (as does The Report 
(2013)). Everyday corrupt practices cannot be neglected when citizens face strong 
pressure to be corrupt in order to access services legally due to them. In this 
environment initiatives against bribery are unlikely to have any effect (Batory, 
2012). The EU’s initiatives, and its administrative traditions, are routed in a 
Western European context of institutional stability, but the core state institutions 
in the CEE countries have been in profound transformation after the collapse of 
communism (Dimitrova, 2010). 
The reasons for the difficulties of the Eastern enlargement can be seen from 
different perspectives.  On the one hand, the communist past of the CEE countries 
indicates differences compared to the Western member states - informality and 
                                                          
2
 In this research I refer as old member states who joined before 1981 to the EU, and as 
new member state to the countries, which joined with the Eastern Enlargement.  
3 
In this research I use CEE countries as the countries with communist past and Westen- 
EU countries, without major influence of communist tradition. 
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petty corruption had a long tradition under the Communist regime in Hungary and 
in other CEE countries (Sajó, 2002, Galasi and Kertesi, 1987). After the fall of the 
communist system the phenomenon of petty corruption persisted and even 
proliferated in these societies (Holmes, 1997). Informal transactions that would be 
labelled as corrupt in one EU member state (e.g. Sweden or UK) may be morally 
accepted practice in the cultural context of another member state (e.g. Hungary, 
Slovakia or Czech Republic). Supporting this statement Batory (2012) argues that 
in the CEE countries corruption remained a systemic element of the state-society 
relationship to overcome bureaucracy. During the communist period low-level 
and high-level corruption were mutually tolerated in Hungary in order to maintain 
political stability (Gellén, 2014). On the other hand, after the democratic transition 
the CEE countries chose to approach the Western world - which resulted in 
joining to international organisations, such as NATO and the EU. The EU 
accession required the CEE countries to comply with EU standards in relation to 
economic indicators, living standards and the rule of law. Hence, the accession of 
CEE countries to the EU implies that these countries have been able to achieve 
notable progress in promoting the rule of law and living standards. However, the 
efficiency of the instruments provided by the EU for decreasing corruption during 
the CEE countries’ negotiation and accession process - such as directives, 
recommendations and policies - can be debated (DeRidder, 2009; Mungiu-
Pippidi, 2005). It seems that instead of establishing successful institutions for 
reducing corruption (in this project particularly in Hungary), the result was 
producing laws which do not meet the socio-economic context of the CEE 
countries (e.g. whistleblowing act, 2013: CLXV). Instruments that worked well in 
old EU member states (e.g. anti-corruption measures such as penalising various 
conducts previously not recognised as criminal and setting up specialised anti-
corruption agencies, courts and prosecution services) show their limitations in the 
post-communist countries (DeRidder, 2009; Batory, 2012). Finally, following 
Polese’s (2008) argument, I suggest that corruption is not an objective term - it 
depends on the context and the same definition is not applicable everywhere. 
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‘Offering a box of chocolates to a teacher...  does not have the same meaning in 
Odessa (or Budapest) and London’ (Polese, 2008:57). 
2. Research problem 
 
The main differences between forms of corruption in the EU member states are in 
low-level corruption: In the United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark less than 1% 
of respondents to the Special Eurobarometer of Corruption (2013) had been 
expected to pay a bribe, compared to Hungary 13%, Slovakia 14% and Poland 
15%. According to the Freedom House’s Nation in Transit 2015 Survey Hungary 
scored 3.75 for corruption (scale is to 1 to 7 and 7 is the worst), in contrast to 
other post-communist countries which scored above 6 (Russia 6.75, Azerbaijan 
6.75, Ukraine 6, Uzbekistan 6.75). 
It seems that low-level corruption is a complex phenomenon, and in Hungary (and 
similarly in other CEE countries) there are several areas where the informal rules 
and practices are prevalent and dominate everyday life, thereby subverting formal 
structures. Informal transactions are widespread in sectors such as education, 
police, local government, sport organisations - where citizens and state officials 
interact more intensively on a daily basis. In post-communist countries, because 
of the relatively quick democratic transition, the old (communist) and new 
(democratic) systems coexisted, and still coexist, which produces systemic 
corruption (Schweitzer, 2003). This means that the formal (written, ratified law) 
and informal (unwritten, but used by the members of society) regulating 
mechanisms coexist and often clash. Therefore an interesting phenomenon arises 
in the form of informal transactions
4
 between the public sphere (health care, 
education, local government other authorities) and the citizens. It is possible to 
argue that the informal transactions often do not go further than might be expected 
in a context of a friendship (for example), and it can be perceived positively - “the 
                                                          
4
 Informal economic practices those which are not regulated, monitored or controlled 
directly or indirectly by the state. With regards to formal and informal regulating 
mechanisms, formal can be defined in terms of state institutions and informal is outside 
the state’s regulatory regime. 
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police officer was a good person, instead of the fine, I had to pay only a bribe” 
(Ledeneva, 1998; Jancsics, 2014). When there is interaction between citizens and 
authorities (officials), the cost may be the power or property of the state. This 
means that as a legacy of the communist past, the state as an organisation plays a 
significant role in propagating the flow of informal transactions.  
In the introduction I mentioned how few corruption cases are reported in 
Hungary. Whistleblowing is an EU-wide regulated and accepted tool for reducing 
low-level corruption. Most assessments, reports and policy papers on 
whistleblowing are only concerned with it's legal background. The TI’s report on 
whistleblowers in the EU (2013) does not take into consideration how well a 
country’s whistleblowing laws and regulation work in practice when rating 
countries. In the CEEC region the K-monitor (Hungarian NGO) presented a paper 
in 2010 on whistleblowing that also only concentrated on the legal framework.  
The same paper revealed that in Hungary more than half of public officials 
answering a survey about reporting corruption responded, “The less said, the 
better.”  
This thesis is intended to make a contribution to the understanding of low-level 
corruption in Hungary using socio-legal theories, and also to explain new factors 
which might strengthen prevalent corruption such as the reasons behind the low 
frequency of formally reported complains of corruption. 
3. Literature review 
 
There has been much research which produced theoretically and empirically 
grounded accounts of the various manifestations and forms of low-level 
corruption and informal economic transactions. The literature review 
demonstrates the richness of empirical data which can be generated, and also 
presents how authors from different academic traditions (such as sociology, legal 
and political studies, economy, ethnography and anthropology) can clearly 
contribute to debates regarding the role of informal economic transaction in a 
number of theoretical and conceptual ways. 
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The scholarly interest in low-level corruption is particularly prevalent in the fields 
of economy (Elliott, 1997; Kiltgaard, 1988; Szántó at al., 2009), sociology 
(Ledeneva,1998; Patico, 2002), organisation sociology (Jancsics, 2013, 2014), 
anthropology (Anders and Nuijten, 2005;  Rivkin-Fish, 2005;  Polese, 2008;  
Shore and Haller, 2005), political science (Karklins, 2002; Mungiu-Pippidi, 
2005), ethnography (Flood, 2003) and, last but not least, socio-legal scholarship 
(Urinboyev and Svensson, 2013;  Holmes, 1997). 
I found that these studies were focused on five key factors - namely the 
communist past, economic explanations, structural factors, legal factors and 
sociological factors. 
The first factor considered is the communist past. According to the most common 
theory, the causes of corruption in post-soviet societies relate either to the 
transition phase or to the communist past (Karklins, 2002; De Ridder, 2009; 
Georgiev, 2013). Hajnal (2008) suggests that during communism, petty 
corruption’s function was to facilitate state-society relationships to ensure that 
actions of public administration and public service that otherwise ought to happen, 
would in fact take place. Lomnitz (1988) notes that during communism, the use of 
personal connections (social networks) has been recognised as a central strategy 
to overcome shortages caused by the inefficiencies of the system. In connection 
with the transition phase Jancsics (2014) suggests that the economic insecurity 
following the communist era and global recession, combined with the new 
political regime (such as in Hungary), can be the cause of rising corruption. 
The second factor considered is economic explanations, with most scholars 
favouring the principal-agent model. This is valid from an economic point of view 
- i.e. taking part in corruption appears a rational decision in the spectrum of cost-
benefit. Szántó et. al. (2009) identified some typical network configurations of 
corrupt transactions in Hungary as examples of this. Their research is based on the 
principal-agent-client model and many other approaches to corruption show 
similarities to Schweitzer’s (2003) cost-benefit duality. However this approach 
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seems inappropriate where petty-corruption manifests itself as a survival tactic. 
Polese (2008) proposed that most of the ‘economic transactions’ reported as bribe 
taking have a deeper meaning and can be analysed within the framework of gift 
exchange and proposes the recognition of a grey zone between different levels of 
corruption. The findings of Wallace and Latcheva’s (2006) article about the 
informal economy in transition CEE countries show that the informal economy 
predominates over other economies, especially in Czech Republic and Hungary. 
The Freedom House’s findings revealed that Poland, Hungary and Czech 
Republic have actually regressed democratically during the EU enlargement 
negotiations (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2005). 
Third on the list are social factors. In new EU Member States with a communist 
legacy, the people’s actions are influenced by multiple, alternative (to the state 
law) and often conflicting normative orders (Nijuten and Anders, 2007). Shore 
and Haller (2005) pointed out that corruption is seen as endemic by western 
researchers and policy makers in non-Western, transitional societies, which is 
congruent with the mainstream social scientific approach that emphasises “moral 
inferiority” in corruption and bribery in Central and Eastern Europe. Jancsics 
(2014) challenged the idea of moral inferiority by arguing that in many cases, 
people participate in informal organisational resource exchanges not because of 
immorality or greed, but rather because of powerful external forces, which are 
defined by the author as a ‘Robin Hood’ attitude - consume more; I cannot afford 
to violate the rules; dysfunctional post-socialist institution; don’t turn on an in- 
group mate; gatekeepers; ordered to be corrupt. Informal transactions can follow 
the logic of gift exchange based on the concept of reciprocity between two 
friends. This is similar to Ledeneva's (1998) description of “blat” as an informal 
exchange system based on reciprocity and trust in the Russian economy. 
However, as Jancsics (2014) explains, if one of the participants gives a gift that 
belongs to an organisation or to the state, then that should be considered as 
corruption.  
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Fourthly, as Jancsincs (2013) explains in his paper on petty corruption in CEE 
countries, external structural factors such as physical environment can determine 
the actors’ opportunity. This notion is based on the structural approach, but it 
highlights the importance of organisation in maintaining and supporting informal 
transactions and corruption. Moor (1973) presents the concept of a self-regulating 
social field and the important but limited place of law in it, using the garment 
industry as an example. The so called symbolic or fictive friendships are part of 
the process by which resources are allocated. The phenomenon described by Moor 
(1973) is situated in the private sector, but the fieldwork conducted in the health 
care sector in post-soviet Russia contains similar patterns. Rivkin-Fish (2005) 
presents the doctors’ dilemma: they could accept money informally and acquire 
the feeling that their work was respected, but in doing so they would need to break 
the law, and risk being exposed as ‘corrupt’. On the other hand, they could refuse 
to take payments, enjoy the safety of following the rules, but thereby exclude 
themselves from the possibility of receiving both symbolic status and material 
gain. These examples show clearly the existence of moral economy inside the 
system or organisation.  
The fifth, legal factor, is connected to inadequate legislation. As a part of the EU 
anti-corruption policy, there are some EU level reports which make an attempt to 
provide an overview of the EU as a whole, but at the same time giving a nation-
specific analysis of the member states. The latest EU Anti-Corruption Report 
(2014) directed attention to the inadequate legislation of whistleblowing in 
Hungary, which results in the low number of formally reported cases of 
corruption. In contrast to the situation in Hungary, a British study presented the 
inside story for whistleblowers as told by 1,000 callers to Public Concern at 
Work’s confidential advice line. This high number of samples was collected 
between 20 August and 30 December 2010. (In comparison, the Hungarian 
Ombudsman received 220 reports during similar time period). It is a study about 
people who witnessed malpractice in the workplace and are unsure whether or 
how to raise their concern. This study is outstanding in the way that it tries to 
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create a profile of possible whistleblowers. The inadequate legislation can be a 
reason behind the low number of formally reported wrongdoings, which indicates 
a fear of retaliation. 
 Definition of corruption 
When examining and comparing the problem of corruption in EU countries, it is 
difficult to find a unified definition of corruption
5
. Karklins (2002) argues that 
when examining corruption in post-communist countries, the TI’s definition - 
which is similar to that of the World Bank and the EU (EU Anti-Corruption 
Report, 2014) - “the misuse of public power for private gain” - needs an addition, 
such as "at the expense of the public good". Shore and Haller (2005) noted that 
the TI's definition is Western Centric - it may be not appropriate in the special 
social settings of the CEE countries, which are influenced by communist legacy. 
Jancsics (2013) presents the definition of corruption as an informal/illegal and 
secret exchange of formally allocated resources. In other words, money, goods or 
other resources, which are considered to belong to an organisation or collectivity, 
are instead handled or exchanged covertly in ways that benefit one or more 
persons who are not the formal owner. This definition takes into consideration the 
special social settings of Hungary and captures the essence of the social functions 
of ‘mass petty corruption’ (Gellén, 2014). Therefore I will employ this definition 
in my thesis. I am also keen to establish a corruption definition which is specific 
in the Hungarian context as it is perceived by the interviewee. 
Petty corruption 
From an economical point of view, petty or low-level corruption occurs when 
private actors interact with non-elected government officials, particularly lower-
level, administrative bureaucrats (Elliott, 1997). From a political point of view 
Karlkins (2002) organises corrupt acts according to their level of damage for the 
citizens and political consequences. She argues that when individual citizens 
                                                          
5
  For example there is no unified criminal definition of corruption within Member States 
thus leading to different ways of recording corruption related offences. (EU Anti-
Corruption Report, 2014) 
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initiate the bribe (for example to a traffic policeman) it is politically less 
consequential than instances where public officials extort payoff from citizens in 
an organised manner. However, Klitgaard (1988) suggested that rampant petty 
corruption may also be more politically corrosive over time because it affects 
more people on a regular basis. Jancsics’s (2013) sociological definition of petty 
corruption, which describes the phenomenon in the Hungarian context, is similar 
to the previously mentioned definitions in the sense that it occurs between low-
level officials of state administrations and their clients, and it involves relatively 
small sums of money or exchanges of favours between street level bureaucrats 
and ordinary citizens. The definition contains the 'favour' as an element. 
Explaining the economies of favours (in the case of countries with socialist past), 
Humphrey (2002) argues in his paper that many respondents found activities - 
traditionally understood as corruption or bribery - legitimate and appropriate 
behaviour and did not perceive them as corrupt. In other cases people saw the 
inappropriateness of their behaviour, but chose to obey much stronger social 
forces that somewhat legitimated or at least made the act ethically neutral 
(Humphrey, 2002). The favour can be seen as similar to the informal exchange 
system “blat” which is based on reciprocity and trust in the Russian economy, as 
described by Ledeneva (1998). It could also manifest itself as nepotism (including 
friendship and party membership as well as relatives) which was wide-spread in 
communism (Georgiev, 2013). 
During writing the literature review I explored the social settings of CEE 
countries and the possible interpretation of low-level corruption in research papers 
and the factors which can play a role in the persistence of low-level corruption in 
Hungary. I also identified a suitable approach and definition for examining 
corruption. I consider the first factor - the communist past - as a valid one, but it is 
important to note that informal transactions proliferated during and after the 
transition process and also after the EU accession (Holmes, 1997). Economic, 
cost-benefit explanations often rule out situations such as "the system made me do 
it” (Karklins, 2005) or survival strategy - "I do it because I have to" - because it 
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assumed to be a free choice to participate in informal transactions. The 
sociological factors take into consideration conflicting normative orders and 
alternative morality in society, which provide a strong base to elaborate on using 
socio-legal theories. Structural factors are extremely important to my research, 
because the subjects are all situated in organisational structures. It is important to 
note that - following Ehrlich’s notion of social association - there are informal 
associations inside the formal organisation, and their rules also have an effect on 
the interviewees. Legal factors have particular importance because of the 
difficulties that the Hungarian state had to face after the democratic transition 
(after the fall of communism) and the EU accession. 
This research contributes additional empirical evidence to the literature on 
informal economic transaction in post-communist countries (specifically in the 
CEE context) by analysing petty-corruption from a sociology of law perspective, 
focusing on the co-existence of - and occasional conflict between - state law and 
informal norms. This approach provides us with nuanced understanding of how 
and why petty corruption remains prevalent in Hungarian society despite the 
innumerable anti-corruption initiatives and Hungary’s accession to EU. 
4. The aim of the research and research questions 
 
Based on the gaps and deficiencies of previous research I formulated the 
following research aims and questions. The aim of the research is to provide 
nuanced and contextual understanding of the reasons behind the existence and 
persistence of low-level corruption in Hungary. Using unstructured interviews I 
will explore the perceptions of low-level corruption and the social obstacles 
preventing formally reporting wrong-doings. I will consider whistleblowing - the 
implementation of which as an instrument was recommended by the EU. It is a 
good example of an (anti-corruption) instrument which works well in Western EU 
countries, however has little effect or practical use in CEE countries like Hungary, 
even if the legal background exists (EU Anti-Corruption Report, 2014). The 
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interviews will help to define an informal definition of corruption, and identify in 
which respects it differs from the legal definition, which is an important part of 
mapping and understanding the unwritten rules of informal transactions. The 
research will include not only the internal actor’s perspective (citizens), but also 
the external actors’ perspective of the subject - such as anti-corruption 
organisations and relevant ministries. In accordance with the aim of the thesis, the 
paper will address the following research questions:   
Why is low-level corruption so persistent in Hungary despite the democratic 
transformation that took place after the fall of communism and the EU 
accession? 
a) Why do people continue to pay bribes? 
b) Why are there so few formally reported low-level corruption cases? 
c) Under what circumstances do people report wrongdoings? 
d) What is the difference between the legal definition and informal definition 
of corruption (as it is perceived by members of society)? 
e) How is the problem of wide-spread petty corruption and the low level of 
officially reported petty corruption cases perceived by external actors (such 
as anti-corruption organisations and the government / relevant ministries)? 
To what extent is this perception reflected in their policy? 
5. Historical outlook  
 
It was emphasised above that the history of Hungary plays a central role in 
examining and understanding the reasons behind persistent low-level corruption. 
Therefore I will provide a brief historical outlook. Instead of presenting 
Hungarian history in detail I adopted a legal-historical point of view (In the 
Appendix I listed the main stages of Hungarian history, indicating the different 
forms of government). Historical episodes where a legally plural environment 
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appeared will be presented briefly. In general, legal pluralism seems to flourish in 
the following situations: the country chooses to join and adopt the principles and 
laws of another state (it can manifest in a coalition); the country chooses to join an 
international organisation; the result of a violent occupation of the country. 
Hungary is situated on the clash point of West and East, and from the early history 
of state there have been situations where the king and the nobles (in 1000) or the 
citizens (in 2003) have had to choose between joining to the West or the East. At 
other times the country was forced into a coalition by the West (1867, Austro-
Hungarian Empire) or occupied violently by the East (1526, Ottoman Empire; 
1945, Soviet occupation). The main episodes which generated a legally plural 
environment were when Hungary became part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
(1867-1918), during the Soviet occupation (1945-1990) and from 2004 with the 
EU accession. During the first two periods people reacted by revolting against the 
oppressor (1848, 1956), and when these attempts failed they have utilised so-
called passive resistance. 
Ottoman Hungary 1541-1699 
In 1526 military forces from the Ottoman Empire under the leadership of Sultan 
Suleiman I annihilated the armies of the Kingdom of Hungary at the Battle of 
Mohács under King Louis II. The country was divided into three parts: Ottoman 
Hungary, Transylvania and the Habsburgs part. The Ottomans divided the 
territory of the Kingdom of Hungary that came under their control into 
administrative districts (called eyalets). The Ottoman occupation lasted almost 
200 years in certain part of the country, but it had no lasting legally plural effect. 
Ottoman policy manifested in the systemic deconstruction of the country through 
depopulation, imprisonment of the original population and the repopulation of the 
land with foreign settlers. The Ottomans did not compel the Christians of the 
empire to adopt Islam. The Ottoman occupation had little cultural effect on the 
Hungarian people, because the two populations were separated - thanks to the 
resettlement policy. The Ottomans were more interested in economic exploitation 
than the assimilation of the local people (Pálffy, 2009). 
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Hungary from 1945-1990 
Although the communist regime in Hungary was not totalitarian, the state-party 
tried to satisfy the Stalinist ordinance of social legality by transforming the 
Hungarian laws, and as a consequence of that the legal system was drastically 
altered. Low-level criminal and deviant behaviour in communist Hungary were 
responses to regime oppression, but the underlying social, cultural and economic 
dislocation resulting from the modernisation of Hungary was also a significant 
factor (Brown, 2007). Before 1945 the modernisation process was under way, 
assisted by the post-war coalition government, which was accompanied by broad 
popular support. Peasants left their farms in search of wage labour in factories. 
Women and youths entered the workforce in much greater numbers than ever 
before. A vast majority of the population found themselves working longer hours 
for less money than they had before the war.  The Stalinist variant of modernity 
imposed on Hungary both intensified these modernising tensions and directed 
popular dissatisfaction with them directly back to the state. The communist 
system was often confounded by pre-existing modes of social, cultural and 
economic organisation. In the Soviet case, Lynne Viola has argued that “The great 
irony of resistance - or what the state chose to see as resistance - is that its 
identification as such in combination with the state’s repression led to the 
strengthening of older cultural formation, identities and loyalities” (Viola, 2008,  
p.41.). The shadow or second economy flourished under communism.  Systemic 
shortage of day to day goods and services under planned Stalinist economy 
motivated the emergence and expansion of ‘blat’ networks (Ledeneva, 2009). The 
‘blat’ is a system of informal inter-personal network operating on principles 
emphasising reciprocal exchanges of favours (Aliyev, 2013). In the Hungarian 
context the system was never called blat, but ‘uram-bátyám rendszer’, which has 
same functions as ‘blat’ networking and can be translated as "old-boys network". 
The crackdown after the 1956 revolution resulted in divergence from Hungary’s 
Eastern European neighbours: while other states of Eastern Europe retained a 
more doctrinaire form of communism, Hungary became “the happiest barracks in 
the Bloc”, thanks to the reforms such as small scale private production and retail 
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trade becoming legal once again, privately-owned household plots were allowed 
and the cultural sphere was controlled more indulgently (Brown, 2007).  
1990- Democratic transition 
After the fall of the communist system a democratic transition started. As a part of 
the transition there was an emphasis on building trust between the state and the 
citizen. Janos Kornai (2004), the internationally recognised researcher of the post-
socialist system summarised the biggest challenges of a democratic transition 
process: 
1. Citizen participation in the preparation of bills through referendums, advocated 
by interest groups or directly. 
2. Impartial, neutral organisations and accountability: central bank, energy sector, 
judicial service, transparent monitoring, auditing. 
3. Referendums, which establish participation in decision-making, and not only in 
decisions affecting the whole country, but in smaller-scale, local questions as 
well. 
4. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) play an important role in building 
trust. There is a positive correlation between the activity of NGO’s and civil 
organisations and the mutual trust between the state and the members of the 
society. 
5. Joining to International Organisations, such as NATO, the EU, World Bank, 
UN, WHO. 
EU accession 
In 2003 Hungarian citizens voted to join the European Union in a referendum. It 
is difficult to evaluate the success of the democratic transition without political 
overtones, and that is not the purpose of this thesis. However, fourteen years after 
the democratic transition, Hungary became a part of the European Union. It is 
visible that during that fourteen year period the Hungarian state and society had to 
complete a big journey from communism to become EU-conformed. Following 
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the eastern enlargement process, the EU’s legal cultures became diverse and 
plural - in both the traditional legal pluralist sense - different legal systems co-
existing in the same geographical space (Avbelj, 2006, Twining, 2000) - and also 
in the increased inconsistency of the EU’s common regulations and those of the 
member states
6
 (Barber, 2006). 
6. Theory: living law, legal pluralism 
 
Ehrlich’s ’living law’  
Corruption during socialism occurred through a network of connections for 
exchanges of services (barter trade, non-monetary exchange) and was draped in 
the rhetoric of friendship (Georgiev, 2013). At the same time widespread petty 
corruption and the culture of mutual favours made everyday life tolerable 
(Sandholt & Taagepera, 2005). Jancsics (2014) and Urinboyev and Svensson 
(2013) present petty corruption as a part of everyday culture that is built on the 
imperative of individual and collective survival. I will examine various forms of 
informal organisation, regulation and governance which occur outside the state 
law. After conducting the field research I realised that Ehrlich’s living law is a 
suitable analytical framework to theorise the results. Living law is the “law that 
dominates life itself even though it has not been posited in legal propositions” 
(Ehrlich, 2002:493). Ehrlich argued that social life is guided by norms of conduct, 
which are parts of the whole of law or living law even if they have not been 
posited in legal proposition (Deflem, 2008). Living law is primary in social life, 
its goal is to maintain the peace and cooperation in the community. Ehrlich, using 
the legal pluralist approach, reminds jurists that talking about society without 
empirically studying its diversity is inadequate (Gessner and Nelken, 2007). To 
distinguish the legal norms from other types of normative statements and 
behaviours he developed the so called 'opinion necessitatis theory' (Ehrlich, 
                                                          
6
 Barber (2006) argues in his study about legal orders of European Union that legal 
system is pluralist when it contains inconsistent rules of recognition that cannot be legally 
resolved from within the system. 
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2002). In this social-psychological approach he considered reactive social 
emotions - the violation of legal norms of living law evoked revolt in people as an 
emotive reaction (Trevino, 2013:8).  Ehrlich suggested that people in communal 
relationships perform their duties whilst creating their own rules. The norms of 
conduct tie the community together. Ehrlich developed his theory in contrast to 
the legal positivist viewpoint of his time. The positivistic theories refer to law as a 
body of legal rules or norms which exist independently of social and cultural 
practices of the citizens and the officials (Banakar, 2012). Law would primarily 
stem from the authority of the state and it has a formalistic system of rules and 
procedures which provide authority and unity to law as a system. In contrast, 
Ehrlich introduced the theory of social association which is based on simple and 
complex social relations (face to face, state) and organised association on a basis 
of four so-called facts of law: usage, domination, possession, disposition (Deflem, 
2008).  He argued that society consisted of many associations, and positive law is 
only one of them. It also means that the state is not superior to other associations.  
Legal pluralism 
Using legal pluralism as one of the guiding theories of the thesis is suitable on the 
one hand because of the existence of normative orders other than the state law in 
Hungary, and on the other hand because of the legally plural environment which 
is the result of being a part of the EU. Legal pluralism is one of the dominant 
concepts in the field of legal anthropology and it can be seen as a key concept in a 
postmodern view of law. According to Merry (1992) legal pluralism is generally 
defined as a situation in which two or more legal systems coexist in the same 
social field. The representatives of legal anthropological scholarship (Merry 1988, 
Griffiths 1992, von Benda-Beckmann 2002, Nuijten and Anders, 2007) agree that 
the state does not have a monopoly on law, because there are all sorts of 
normative orders not attached to the state which nevertheless are law.  Sally Falk 
Moore (1973) states the fundamental assumption of legal pluralism - when 
presenting the idea of semi-autonomous social field - that not all the phenomena 
related to law (and not all that are law-like) have their source in government. 
Benda-Beckmann (2002) advocated legal pluralism explaining that law has many 
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forms of existence: law may be embodied in written and spoken text; law can 
exist in the knowledge of people; law may be inscribed into the status of persons, 
resources and organisations as well as into social relationships and institutions, 
giving them a legal status, usually with wide-ranging legal consequences, which, 
under the conditions of legal pluralism, are potentially ‘multi-normative’ (Benda-
Beckmann, 1999); law may be involved in social processes / social interaction. 
Tamanaha (1993) argues in “The Folly of Legal Pluralism” that such a generous 
view of what law is perilously close to the conclusion that all forms of social 
control are law. He suggested a solution to the problem: to come up with a 
definition of law independent of the state, yet able to differentiate law from other 
forms of normative order. Living law and theories of legal pluralism in general are 
often criticised for failing to distinguish between certain social and cultural norms 
on the one hand, and legal norms on the other (Banakar, 2012). 
In the analytical part I discuss different organisations (hospital, school, local 
government, sport organisation). I see these organisations as social associations. 
In these social associations two or more legal systems co-exist (Merry,1992) - 
which is compatible with the definition of legal pluralism - and I could observe 
normative orders beside the state regulations. Two (or more) normative orders 
could be seen in the observed areas: state law, and the lived rules of normative 
order (which Ehrlich contrasted to the state law).  There plural normative orders 
not only co-exist, but come into contact and clash, and so legal pluralist theory 
and Ehrlich’s living law theory helped to analyse my collected data. The use of in-
depth unstructured interviews as the methodology of the thesis is compatible with 
these theories because, similarly to Ehrlich, I collected empirical data on social 
practices and usages, and I wanted to find out how law actually works. 
7. Methodology 
 
I have chosen to follow an anthropological approach to law and use corresponding 
research methods, because I was interested in understanding the informal norms, 
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practices and constitution of society. Anthropology is concerned with 
understanding the rules and norms that govern social conduct. This approach is 
also useful for exploring what corruption means in different parts of the world, 
how it is embedded in everyday life, why intolerance to corruption is greater in 
some places than others and how it becomes institutionalised and reproduced 
(Haller and Shore, 2005). Griffith (1992) notes that an ethnographic approach to 
law has advantages when documenting people’s experiences of law in daily life. 
The research of corruption requires qualitative research techniques, because its 
measurement is based on people’s perception.  
The field research took place between April and May 2015 in Hungary. The field 
work consisted of two parts: observation and unstructured interviews. I performed 
these two data collection methods in parallel. I conducted most of the interviews 
in Budapest, except for the interviews with the local government member and the 
ex-mayor, which took place in a small town close to the Lake Balaton. I chose 
Budapest as a main area for my research because I had the contacts and social 
network available there.  
I adopted a perspective which examines low-level corruption from the view-point 
of those citizens who are in a position to handle the money or property of state or 
local government, or an organisation tightly connected to state or local 
government, or in a position where they could abuse the power delegated to them 
by the state. The citizens who work in these positions in Hungary are mostly 
public servants or civil servants. When choosing the participants I considered the 
following areas: health care, police, education, local government, EU funds, and 
the following occupations: doctors, policemen, primary school teachers, 
university teachers, PhD students, ministry-workers, secretaries in civil 
organisations, members of local government and small town mayors. 
Before contacting the interviewees I prepared an invitation and a participant 
information sheet about taking part in the research. It contained the title of the 
research and contact details of the researcher and supervisor. It stated that the 
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research is part of a master thesis in sociology of law at Lund University, Sweden. 
It also contained an invitation paragraph regarding the research, explained the 
purpose of the research, the nature of the research topic, what will happen if the 
potential participant chose to take part, notes about confidentiality, and the 
presentation of the results. I also explained how the collected material would be 
used, and that during the interviews I wouldn’t use an audio-recording device. I 
presented an ethical statement explaining that I wouldn’t use and abuse the 
participants’ personal data. I also attached an outline of the interview with 
questions and some made up examples of low-level corruption cases (the full 
document is situated in the Appendix II in English.) 
I sent out the invitation to 20 people from the selected areas, and I received 
positive replies from all the target people. After the replies I made appointments 
with the interviewees. I left it up to them to decide where they wanted to meet. I 
conducted unstructured interviews. Being Hungarian, I had the advantage of 
knowing the language and having an understanding of the local conditions and 
situations, which provided an internal perspective to the study. Before the 
interviews I prepared some guiding questions. I had two purposes for this. Firstly, 
I sent out the questions to the interviewees so they had time to think about the 
subject. Secondly, the questions and the interview have a special logic and built 
up structure, and it helped me to keep up the process of the interview. However, 
the questions were mainly used as a guide and were adapted according to the pace 
of the interview. 
The logic of the interview questions was as follows: I started with general 
questions about corruption in Hungary. Here most of the interviewees referred to 
political corruption. I guided them to talk about low-level corruption. I asked 
questions about their perception of petty corruption in different time periods: 
during communism (which they preferred to call socialism), after the democratic 
transition (1990), and finally after the EU accession. I also asked them about 
typical excuses, rituals and usages of corruption. After the general part I started to 
ask specific questions related to their working places (areas) and their own 
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behaviour and perception of corruption. There were questions about the necessity 
of corruption, how they would define corruption, and their participation in corrupt 
activities. Most of the questions worked according to my expectations. Finally I 
asked questions about formally and informally reporting and handling corrupt 
activities which they have experienced in their working place. The interviews 
lasted from 45 minutes to 2 hours, depending on the interviewee. Safety 
precautions both for researchers and interviewees forced me to avoid all types of 
apparent documentation methods, such as recording and taking notes. Instead, 
immediately following an interview, I wrote down my recollections. To protect 
the anonymity of informants, a number was assigned to each informant instead of 
using their name. During the presentation of the results I will use fictitious names. 
During the field research, extensive and rich material was collected.  The full 
presentation of all the collected material would exceed the limitations of a master 
thesis, therefore I chose to present certain interviews and specific topics that have 
more relevance to my research questions. These are education (in primary school), 
civil organisations and local government (mayor and local government member). 
All of these topics contain information about the abuse of EU funds. Guided by 
the research question, I also present interviews with the representatives of relevant 
state and civil society (anti-corruption) organisations.  
8.  Presentation of the data and analysis 
 
The nature of the research and the collected material require a special structure for 
the presentation. I will present relevant sections of the unstructured in-depth 
interviews as originally spoken (or in the words of) by the interviewees. It is 
appropriate because of the words chosen and the logic that they have used. I 
conducted the interviews in Hungarian language. It is a rich language with many 
expressions and synonyms for the same word. For example low-level corruption 
was described with many different words “mutyi”, “kummantás” “megoldjuk 
okosba” “sumákolás”, “simliskedés”. I tried to translate the text in a way which I 
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think reflects the most the original thoughts and words. The linguistic presentation 
is useful to understand the local context of informal transactions. In practice, 
when I translated the invitation for the research and the interview questions to 
Hungarian, I couldn’t find an adequate word to describe low-level corruption, 
because the phenomenon, which is well known by the members of the society, 
cannot be described only by low sums of money and the involvement of low-level 
officials. I chose to call the phenomenon 'everyday corruption' when talking about 
it with the interviewees.  
The analysis part cannot be separated from the presentation of the collected data 
because in the different sections I explore different aspects of low-level 
corruption. Because the interviews are presented in a narrative way it is more 
convenient and logical to provide the analysis immediately after the interviews 
rather than in a different section. 
8.1. Observation 
As part of the research I conducted observation in parallel with the unstructured 
interviews. I didn’t plan the observation as a separate part of the fieldwork, but 
during my stay in Hungary, I unintentionally observed some examples of informal 
economic practices and the appearance of local moral codes. 
While walking on the streets of Budapest to an interview - which took place in a 
public café - I saw that a police car stopped another car. One of the policemen 
walked around to the driver while the second policeman stayed behind. When the 
driver emerged from his car, he offered his hand for a handshake (in Hungary 
handshake is a part of salutation, but it is mostly informal) as a sign of greeting to 
the policeman with a big smile on his face. At that point I was very close to them 
so I saw that the man hid some cash in his hand, and the policemen accepted it 
during the handshake. Immediately after the transaction they looked around for 
anybody who might have observed the transaction. I didn’t show any sign of 
interest, and just walked past. I heard that the policeman immediately instructed 
the man to go on his away. In Hungary it is the most common informal transaction 
which takes places on the roads, but I have never observed the transaction in this 
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manner. Normally it takes time, and has a whole ritual around the informal 
payment: firstly, the policeman wants to find out whether the person would be 
willing to pay or not. This time there was no such ritual before the action.  
Obviously the man had enough money and experience with this type of 
transaction and he was in a hurry. When this informal transaction takes place, 
there are certain rules and communication forms which are well-known amongst 
the citizens and the police. The first sign for the call or openness for corruption 
was that the second policeman stayed in the car. If there are two of them, it is 
more difficult to initiate a transaction. For example the sentence “we can find 
another solution” is a call for bribery. The driver must give the bribe hidden in the 
car’s registration certificate or during the handshake. Citizens are aware of the 
police’s corrupt practices, however they have several reasons to choose to solve 
the problems in an informal way.  The observed transaction, and the way as it 
happened, showed a shared language between the police officer and the citizen. It 
also shows that it wasn’t an individual case - the driver was aware of what he had 
to do to avoid penalty points, the waste of time and paying a fine.  
The citizens feel that even if they would report the transaction, the police 
wouldn’t investigate: they should provide strong evidence of the act, probably 
video footage, or a record of the conversation just to start a case (submit an 
accusation). On the other hand if the citizen really broke the law, it is cheaper to 
pay a bribe than the fine.  I learnt from some of the informants that they see this 
kind of corruption as an ongoing fight between the police and the citizens:  
“It was the case with the medical kits. They started to check the expiry dates of 
the medical kits in the cars. So people started to buy medical kits. There is no 
regulation, no laws about it, but they still could threaten you, just to get some 
money. I wanted to buy a medical kit too, but then they stopped checking. I guess 
they came up with something else…” 
This passage also implies that police corruption is not a separate, single act of 
some individuals, and there is no easy way to stop it. In other words it shows the 
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existence of a shared language among policemen, which serves to reconstruct the 
meaning and application of traffic laws. Citizens, instead of resisting paying 
unlawful bribes, play according to the rules of “living law” that is commonplace. 
Another time I was travelling on a tram. After ten minutes of my journey I 
observed some movement in the carriage. Some people desperately wanted to 
reach the machines which validate the ticket, and other people moved closer to the 
door, preparing for a quick exit when the tram stopped. These were the signs that 
ticket inspectors were on the tram. Some people failed to show tickets, and one of 
them had to leave the tram at the next stop accompanied by three inspectors. 
When the tram left the station we sadly looked at the poor fellow, who was caught 
by the inspectors and was surrounded by them as if he was a criminal. I also saw 
that they stopped filling in the official forms, and he was looking for his wallet.  It 
is fascinating that there are always some people who get caught. On one hand 
there are problems with the transportation and ticketing system. You can only buy 
tickets at certain places - there might be a ticket selling machine on the vehicle, 
but it normally doesn’t work. Sometimes the validating machine doesn’t work 
either. It happened to me several times that I didn’t have a season ticket, and I had 
to take public transport to go to the place where I could buy it. Citizens/travellers 
also have to use separate tickets (which cost the same price) on every means of 
transport regardless if the trip takes 5 minutes or 1 hour. On the other hand the 
people in Budapest treat public transport as if it was free for everyone. Public 
transport had relatively low cost, but nowadays it is getting more expensive 
rapidly, and people feel that it is not fair and refuse to buy tickets. Some of them 
simply can’t afford it.  Students and pensioners still can buy season tickets at a 
good price. Interested in the subject, I came across a homepage called “BKV-
figyelő” (Budapest Public Transport Observer) where (similar to the page 
mentioned in the introduction) citizens can submit their experiences with ticket 
controllers and drivers, and about travelling on public transport in general. 
Interestingly, one of the bus drivers submitted a story where the ticket inspectors 
abused a women with young children, telling them their ticket was not valid even 
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though it was validated by the bus driver ten minutes before, and they forced them 
to either get off, buy a ticket from them or pay a bribe. The women asked the 
driver to tell the inspectors that he saw her validating the ticket. When the bus 
driver told the inspectors the truth, their answer was that he should 'just 
concentrate on the driving'. The driver also stated that he tried to submit a 
complaint against the behaviour of the inspectors several times, but the company 
threatened to fire him. He chose this method to inform the passengers about what 
they can expect. This case also shows a shared language not only between the 
inspectors, but the inspectors and the company. It is also interesting how the bus 
driver wants to inform the passengers about the different application of the 
transportation rules - the living law. The inspectors’ behaviour towards the young 
mother has to be distinguished from a redistributive informal transaction - it was 
the abuse of their authority and their physical power. It was more like a predatory 
transaction where resources go from weak to strong. 
Unfortunately I got sick during the fieldwork, and I had to visit the general 
practitioner (GP). When I entered the waiting room I had to get a number which 
indicated my position in the queue. While I was waiting there, several people 
came in and asked for the doctor, calling her by her first name. I noticed that some 
of the patients (mostly the older generation) had presents with them: a bottle of 
wine, chocolate or jar of jam. Some people even went so far that they knocked on 
the GP’s door. My number indicated that I was third in the queue, but I had to 
wait almost two hours because the other patients who arrived with presents got in 
to see the GP before me. I complained to my parents about the service. My father 
explained that he does not take presents to the GP, but there is a very good dentist 
close to where they live, and he always takes some chocolates to her and the 
assistant when he gets a treatment. It means that if he has an urgent problem then 
the doctor will make an appointment for him immediately - for example, if they 
have an empty time slot, they just call him in and he can have the treatment as 
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soon as possible.  He explained that this is nothing to do with thank-you-money
7
. 
It is more than that - building a relationship with them. During the interview with 
the local government member I heard the same argument - “We always brought 
some carrots and flowers for the GP, it was good to be friendly with him if there is 
a problem. Also, I think the Hungarians are just very friendly people, especially in 
the countryside - and barter trade is very common as well. But when you got sick 
it was good that that you could summon the doctor, and he didn’t hesitate to 
come. Of course the doctor is always respected anyway”. 
Author’s comment/ Analysis: 
Theorisation of the observation 
These observations reflected a similar phenomenon observed by Eugen Ehrlich in 
Bukowina a century ago, which he called ‘living law’. Ehrlich’s distinction 
between living law and state law is formulated in a specifically CEE context - that 
of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire - made up of many nationalities, languages 
and cultures. One interesting insight I gained was that the laws and regulation of 
the state are not the only regulators of political, social and economical life in 
Hungary, there are many other competing informal normative orders of living law 
that influence social behaviour and everyday life - in many areas of living - more 
effectively than the laws of the state. The driver’s intention to pay a bribe to the 
policeman (even if he didn’t break the law) and when the passenger bribes the 
ticket inspector suggest a legally plural situation. In this case the facts of living 
law have a greater impact on the situation than the law posited by the state 
(Ehrlich, 2002). When the police are making up false excuses (e.g. medical kit) to 
initiate corruption we have to emphasise that it is not a single, separate act. It 
suggests rules which could be said to have evolved spontaneously out of social 
life, and that there is an inner ordering of the associations (e.g. police) or groups. 
In contrast, the actions of the ticket inspectors, who are using not just their 
authority, but also physical power, to threaten passengers into a corrupt situation 
                                                          
7In practice it means that despite all kinds of medical care being free for most of 
the citizens in Hungary, patients usually willingly pay the doctors after the 
treatment. It is especially widespread at childbirth and at all kind of surgeries. 
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does not indicate the existence of the same rules. Their behaviour, rather, is 
predatory. When visiting the GP, people have to learn the inner orders of the 
social association (which consists of the doctor and the patients) in order to 
receive the GP’s attention - in this case by bringing them chocolate and cognac or 
jam. 
Low salaries - but the state looks away 
The actions of the policeman and the inspector taking bribes can be attributed as a 
way to complement their low salaries. As Polese (2008) suggested in the case of 
Ukraine, the state cannot guarantee a decent salary and therefore overlooks 
informal economic transactions.  In Hungary, in 2013, 10% of policeman (4000 
people) earned the national minimum salary. However Ferenc Krémer (1998), 
criminologist, suggests that the corrupt act doesn’t depend on the salary earned, 
and he disagrees with the policy inside the organisation: the employment of strong 
control, which relies on the hierarchy. The fear inside the organisation won’t stop 
corruption, it will just increase the secrecy.   
Communication strategies 
The case of the corrupt police officer is congruent with Jancsics’ (2014) findings 
on the clients’8 action during corrupt transactions. Jancsics (2014) describes 
communication strategies when he explores the role of clients in petty corruption 
by analysing corrupt exchanges between citizens and low level public and private 
employees in post-communist Hungary. He indentifies the rituals around the 
corrupt practice as a ’mating dance’. This refers to a situation when the citizen is 
usually cautious about asking the other side directly about corruption. They leave 
room for manoeuvre just in case the agent is not willing to be corrupt. This is the 
manner in which the observed transaction is initiated generally. However, in the 
observed situation, the communication can be described using Jancsics’ (2014) 
terminology ‘openly ask’- i.e. when someone knows the structure of corrupt 
situations, and how to communicate with skill in such a situation. Jancsics (2014) 
interestingly distinguishes the role of clients with different social backgrounds in 
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 Jancsics (2014) in his paper sees the corrupt act as a transaction between agent and 
client, where the client is an ordinary citizen. 
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'on the spot' transactions (situations which do not require any previous 
relationship between agent and client). Based on Jancsics’ (2014) categorisation I 
could identify that the client was an entrepreneur, because he participated pro-
actively and confidently - the transaction was initiated boldly without discussion 
with the policeman - he just handed over the money and dominated the situation. 
The culture of ’chocolate and cognac’ 
In the case with the GP, it is important to notice and emphasise the differences 
between the observed situation and the ’thank-you-money’ culture that exists 
Hungary, and the doctor’s dilemma (to accept money for the otherwise free 
service as described by Rivkin-Fish (2005) in Russian health care). The best 
example of the applicability of Ehrlich’s living law ideas on a current social 
problem in Hungary is in the health-care sector: the state couldn’t regulate the so 
called ‘thank-you-money’-giving, and, recognising that the penalty (three years 
imprisonment) for mandatory money or gift-giving had no effect on the flow of 
informal transactions, declared it legal (as long as it happened after the treatment). 
Providing chocolate and cognac (as it appears in the literature) has a special 
meaning. As Patico (2002) discussed, some specific objects take on a special 
meaning when offered as a sign of attention. In this situation the participants 
rarely offer money, because they have a personal relationship with the GP. In the 
case of 'thank-you-money', the patients are aware that any paid amount is to 
compliment the salary of the doctor (they also pay it for receiving particularly 
good treatment). During my fieldwork I only observed chocolate and cognac (or 
their equal) being given, however Patico (2003) suggests that the tendency to 
offer chocolate and cognac is still present, but that money is largely gaining 
ground because of the the ever - increasing availability of luxury goods. 
8.2. Unstructured in-depth interviews 
I have chosen to present four key interviews which cover the areas of education, 
local government, sports organisation and EU funds. I selected these areas 
because they are the public areas most affected by informal economic transactions 
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(after health care and the police)
9
. It would be possible to conduct separate 
research on each area, but in this thesis I consider them all as ‘social associations’ 
as described by Ehrlich (2002). I see certain organisations (primary school, sport 
organisation, local government) as a plurality of human beings who, in their 
relationships with one another, recognise certain rules of conduct as binding, and, 
generally at least, actually regulate their conduct according to them. What Ehrlich 
referred to as the associations’ ‘inner order’ is determined by these rules of 
conduct (Deflem, 2008). This means that law, by definition, is a part of the many 
different kinds of associations in which people interrelate, and that legal pluralism 
is an inherent quality of society (Tervino, 2013). 
Each interview will contain several narratives - I have selected the key highlights 
of the interviews. For a better understanding and for completeness I will also 
present interviews with external actors - the leaders of Transparency International, 
the Society for Civil Rights, and the Ombudsman. 
The structure of the interviews: 
1. Education (Interview 1) 
The interview with the primary school teacher shows the special relationship 
between the teacher and the school children and their parents. In this relationship 
gift-giving is not always regarded as corrupt.  
2. Sport association (Interview 2) 
The interview with the secretary of the sports organisation shows how the 
secretary has to overcome legal difficulties, lack of resources and salaries to run 
the organisation as it is best for the people who work there, and also for the 
athletes and the sport. Sport organisations have a special legal status in Hungary 
which is regulated in a special legal document (2004: I). This means that they are 
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 I base this assumption on the reported low-level corruption cases on the TI’s page, on 
Fizettem.hu, public and political blogs, and on the few reports which were submitted to 
the Ombudsman. 
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half supported by the state, and function half as a civil organisation. That is why 
they are relevant and interesting institutes to examine.  
3. Local government (Interview 3) 
The interview with the local government official shows the conflict between the 
local moral codes and good governance. 
4. Interview with external actors (Interview 4) 
Transparency International as an anti-corruption non-governmental organisation 
(NGO) is the most relevant actor in the fight for an adequate whistleblowing 
legislation, and for this they co-operate with other NGOs such as the Society for 
Civil Rights. According to whistleblowing law (2013: CLXV) the Ombudsman 
and his office is responsible for whistleblowing reports and therefore his insight 
into the functioning of the institute can be relevant. 
8.2.1. Education 
Interview 1 
Katalin, a primary school teacher (58-years old): “Some of the parents in my 
class are more than just parents, rather they are friends” 
"I can tell you about the changes through systems, because I started to work as a 
teacher in 1975 and worked 15 years during the communist period. During 
communism - I would rather call it socialism - everyday corruption appeared in 
different forms than after 1990 and nowadays. It was rather nepotism: everything 
was controlled by the party and the state, the corruption was based on party 
membership, but there was no room for corruption as it is today. There were fewer 
resources, the salaries were low, but you could barely buy anything. Because the 
‘system transition’ (the democratic transition) didn’t happen suddenly, it didn’t 
have much impact. I remember that after joining the EU, there was high 
expectation inside the institute. We were told that we have to change how things 
get done, because we would have to comply with EU standards.  It appeared in 
administration procedures, how and what to teach and how to behave. It was 
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forbidden to accept any gift (even a scone, or a flower) because it is corruption, 
but because there wasn’t any precedent it became less important. The EU funds 
made the corruption worse. It represented a new pot of money, which it was 
possible to spend. 
It is hard to define what is corruption, because some teachers in the school don’t 
even realise that what they do is corrupt, they just simply go with the flow. I am 
conscious about it but I have to do it, because often my boss does it and I am 
forced to take part in it: everybody is involved and they are involved at higher 
levels as well. It is more comfortable to take part in it. 'Just get on with it' - I tell 
to myself.  Some also say that the salaries are too low, but it is not true really. I 
heard such excuses from colleagues, that ‘everybody does it, so I can as well’. 
We are all involved: all the teachers could take part in corruption, because we are 
in an everyday relationship with the parents. I think the schoolmaster could take 
part in more serious corruption, just because of his position and his relationship 
with the council, the education institute (which is responsible for the school’s 
matters) and the parents as well. For example, we don’t know how the institute 
lets the school have two primary school classes of 32 children (according to the 
rules it should be around 20 children in one class), it is against the rules, but we 
don’t ask, because it secures two more working places. I think the headmaster is 
not clean, but he is a good man, he wants to maintain the school integrity and 
working places. The school also took part in the so-called “labor mutyi”10. 
There are certain communication methods and typical questions that the parents 
ask when initiating a proposal: 'My son will get the best grade in mathematics, 
won’t he?', or, 'What we can do to get a better grade?'. But after 40-years teaching 
you know just from the behaviour of the parents and you feel when someone 
expects something (for example) in return for the “end of the year” present. But 
                                                          
10 The ‘labor mutyi’ is a school scandal, when many school applied for EU fund to set up 
a lab in the school, and they bought all kind of equipment and wrote manuals to teaching 
in the lab. However there are not enough qualified teachers who could hold a lesson in the 
labs so all the equipment just stand there without use. 
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nowadays parents can surprise me, really, some of them clearly states an offer. 
One of the parents offered to buy a new electronic board for the school, if the 
headmaster fires one of the teachers. 
I have taken part in corruption, because even if you accept any small gift it is 
corruption. If I think about my own case it is difficult to regard all the gifts as 
corruption, because some of the parents in my class are more than just parents, 
rather they are friends. Sometimes I receive theatre tickets, or for example one of 
the parents suggested and nominated me for a state award. I was nominated 
before, but I didn’t get it, because of some reason - they said nobody will get it 
without help. I got it this time. Her daughter wasn’t so good in mathematics, but 
she was very hard-working. I gave her a better grade, but I think I would have 
done that anyway. 
Corruption is negative but in some cases it is necessary. A bad regulation 
generates necessary corruption. It is also necessary, when the headmaster does it 
to protect a school, or when I have to take part in it to support the school. It is 
negative when it is purely guided by the greed of some teacher: for example when 
the headmaster lent out the institute’s property to a teacher for free without paying 
rent. I didn’t make a formal report, but I told to the headmaster that it is totally 
illegal and he should stop this activity. Luckily the activity stopped, but I think I 
would really report it. I have already looked up where to submit a complaint.  
I would report this case because it was totally illegal, and if it would be public 
knowledge, it would mean a bad reputation for the school. In other cases, I would 
report because the only motivation is greed. I am in a good position.  I am the 
department leader, so I go directly to the headmaster, if nothing happens, then I 
can go further. I think reporting also depends on the position - I could not have 
reported, and I wouldn’t have when I started teaching 40 years ago. I think that 
after I leave the institution I would not report either, because it won’t affect me. If 
I report without name, I feel safe. I feel safe to go the headmaster, but I would feel 
safe in any other ways. I would always prefer to chose an informal rather than a 
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direct way to solve problem, first in the department and after at the headmaster. 
He is a reasonable man, and I can see that he cares about the school. Before we 
had different headmasters - when I had some suggestions they reacted very badly, 
so it was better to be silent." 
Author’s comments / Analysis 
Some of the expressions used by the interviewee require explanation. In general, 
when conducting interviews I have interviewed two different generations: fifty to 
sixty years old (Interview 1 and Interview 3), and twenty-five to thirty-five years 
old (Interview 2). Those citizen who really lived under communism as it was 
before 1956 are already too old to work. The fifty to sixty year old generation 
spent most of their life under communism, but it was already a ‘softer’ 
communism. Therefore, they preferred to refer to the period before 1990 as 
socialism. In Hungary the democratic transition is described as system transition, 
which refers to the change from communism to democracy. ‘Mutyi’ is a word 
which nowadays describe low-level corruption in the Hungary, it describes a 
situation when something is 'dodgy'. 
The key highlights of the interview 
The teachers’ story highlights the relationships inside the organisation/ social 
association between the teachers and teachers, the teachers and the headmaster 
and the teachers and the parents. It explores the normative order inside the social 
association, which differs from the state law, and the regulations of the institute.  
It also provides an insight into the reasons and excuses for taking part in informal 
economic transactions, and the teachers’ perception of necessary corruption and 
greed.  
Key moments of the interview: 
1. The teachers’ participation in everyday corruption: reasons and excuses 
 
(1) The state law and the norms inside the social association differ from each 
other. Some of the teachers follow the rules of the social association and do not 
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consider the state law, and the legality (from the state law perspective) of the 
norms set by the people inside the organisation.  
(2) 'Bad regulation generates necessary corruption'. Sometimes, the regulations 
are wrong and the teachers have to go against the regulation for the students or the 
institutes for their own good.  
(3) Some teachers are conscious of the nature of their transactions, but it is easier 
to go with the flow than fight against it. 
2. The superior’s behaviour - ‘reflexive web of normative expectations’ (Ziegert, 
2009) 
It is important to notice how the headmaster’s behaviour is perceived by the 
teachers, and the effect that it has on the teachers’ actions. It is possible to identify 
three different patterns: 
(1) 'If it is legal for him, why I wouldn’t do it?’ in other words, it can motivate 
corruption. 
(2) ‘If he does it, he will look away when I do it’ - it can also legitimise 
corruption. In this situation the headmaster sets the norms of the social association 
with his acts and behaviour. 
(3) ‘If he does it I have to do it. Just get on with it’ - it forces people to take part, 
to collaborate. Jancsics (2014), based on extensive research (50 in-depth 
interviews) in post-communist Hungary, defined the main types of external 
imperatives for petty corruption. He identified an imperative which shows 
similarities to this: ‘ordered to be corrupt’ - it is an organisational-level 
imperative, which requires a hierarchical relation. The headmaster’s behaviour is 
a crucial part of the social association’s normative ordering. Ziegert (2009), when 
developing Ehrlich’s idea of social association, sees the associations’ internal 
means of regulation as possessing a degree of reflexivity. He explains that the 
legal norms provide the individual members with a relational ‘reference point’ 
that tells them not only what conduct is expected of them, but that also tells them, 
in relative terms, what they can expect from others.  
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3. Friendship and gift-giving 
In Hungary the primary school teacher functions like a third parent. The children 
go to school when they are age seven and the same person will teach them for four 
years. He or she educates the pupils in all subjects except languages and computer 
science. This means that they spend six hours every day for four years with the 
children. In Hungary the parents don’t only want to choose the school, but the 
teacher as well. It is understandable why a teacher-parent relationship can become 
a friendship during four years, and it is build on trust and communication. This is 
the same reason why the parents appreciate the work of the teacher and often 
show respect with gifts and favours. The examination of this special relationship 
helps us to understand the difference between ‘expressing gratitude’ and ‘bribing’. 
This situation is similar to that which Polese (2008) explores in post-Soviet 
Ukraine, and he suggests that the gift-bribe dichotomy lies behind almost all 
transactions. Patico (2002) maintains that there is a sharp difference between 
offering money and offering chocolate and cognac (or in this case theatre tickets), 
because only the latter recognises the 'personhood' of the teacher. From the legal 
point of view there is also little difference: both donations in money and 
commodities are punished as corruption - though a difference exists at socio-
cultural level (Polese, 2008). 
When Katalin mentions that she would have give a better grade to the student 
regardless of receiving the theatre tickets, it implies that she does not consider that 
act as corrupt. Katalin’s perception of the gift-bribe dichotomy is close to what 
Polese (2008) described in the case of the university teachers in Ukraine.  
(1) The frequency of the gift-exchange: it makes a difference if it is a habit of the 
teacher or if it only happened once or twice. 
(2) Whether the gift is given before or after the service itself (‘end of the year’ 
present or during the school year) can determine the nature of the transaction. 
(3) In Polese’s (2008) research, one of the interviewees came up with the 
definition: “If I receive it, is a gift. If I demand it, then it is a bribe”. Katalin never 
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demanded any of the presents - however sometimes she still felt obliged to give a 
better grade. 
4. Accepted corruption and reporting formally or informally: 
Katalin is well aware of the unwritten rules inside the organisation. She 
distinguishes between acceptable and unacceptable corruption: 
Acceptable: A certain level of everyday corruption is accepted. This is congruent 
with what Rumyantseva (2005) reported in Uzbekistan where some of 
interviewees believed that a little corruption does not hurt anyone. 
Unacceptable: (1) if the only motivation is greed, (2) it is happening openly, (3) it 
could affect the school’s reputation negatively, and (4) if the amount of money is 
too big. 
The distinction between the different types of corruption - necessary or pure greed 
- indicates the existence of a dual morality in bribery and reveals the multi-faceted 
meaning and morality of informal transactions. The distinction, and Katalin’s 
emotional reasoning,  reminds us of Ehrlich’s 'Opinio necessitatis', where he 
suggest that the legal norm of living law was unique in that the emotive reaction it 
evoked in people for its violation is revolt (Trevino, 2013:8.). 
There are informal answers for such behaviour, and also formal reports to the 
headmaster. This means that there are unwritten rules which cover corrupt 
activities, but there are informal rules to control the same. The integrity of the 
institution is more important than a scandal. She mentioned that she has to follow 
the unwritten rules (or living law in Ehrlich's terms) of her organisation in order to 
keep her job and maintain the school's reputation. There is no distinction between 
good and bad bribery, but if they regard corruption as necessary, then it is 
acceptable. Informal transactions, which are interpreted as corrupt in the Western 
moral and juridical codes, could be regarded as a morally acceptable behaviour 
according to the living law of the school. This example illustrates well the 
existence of dual competing notions of morality in Hungary, since the actions and 
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working practices of school workers are shaped by the living law as well as the 
juristic law. 
8.2.2. Sport Organisation 
Interview 2 
Istvan, a general secretary in sport organisation (35-year old): “bad 
regulation generates necessary corruption” 
"Generally speaking about corruption in Hungary, I can confirm that it is a big 
problem and it is possible to observe it everywhere you look. It seems to be coded 
into our behaviour somehow. We Hungarians just simply can’t solve some 
problems without corruption. I don’t think that anything changed after 1990, it is a 
long term procedure. However, much changed after the EU accession with the 
introduction of the high number of regulations - for a while - but after it got worse 
again. It seems that we, Hungarians, cannot work in other ways. This behaviour is 
coded in the individuals, or we learnt it from our parents, I don’t know. 
I am taking part in informal economic transactions because I don’t get enough 
salary, and I have to maintain my living standard somehow. I don’t do this job for 
the money, but simply I don‘t get enough. There is a lot of state and EU money, 
which if you don’t claim or deal with, it will land somewhere else. I also do it to 
guarantee the better functioning of the organisation.  
I mentioned the low salary as an excuse for corruption, but at the same time I 
think that a salary raise would not result in engaging in less corruption, because 
the state simply cannot pay that much. A bit more money wouldn’t solve 
anything.  They always say that a pay rise for the police and for health care 
workers would solve corruption, but I don’t think so.  They would just start to live 
in a higher standard, and they would still need additional money to maintain that. 
For example, when you are student, you never have money, but you don’t have 
high expectations, later you start to earn some money, you can buy a car for 
example, but then you have to maintain the car.  
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I deal with corruption on daily basis. I think those who say that they never took 
part in any corruption are lying. So we have an employee in the office who is 
there every day, and he is dealing with the small things like mailing, keeping 
clothes, keeping equipments and so on. He is a voluntary worker on paper, but we 
pay him a salary which is close to the minimum salary. If we would pay a real 
salary it would be twice as expensive for the federation, because then we would 
have to pay to the state all the tax and contributions. So with this trick we save 
money, but at the same time I have to get that money somehow. Our office is in 
the same building as other sport associations’ offices, and we have an active 
relationship with the other workers. They might know something about the trick 
with the employee, but we tend to keep it as a secret. It is also possible that other 
organisations do the same trick, but it is not easy to do. It is actually easier the 
legal way, but you lose money, and you can provide less. This is the choice. 
Two times a year, before Christmas and before the summer, I take the office 
workers - three or four of us - for a lunch as a team-building activity. I am paying 
for the food with money that belongs to the federation. But I really think we 
deserve it. There would be an official way to do this, but it is a lot of paper-work 
and tax, so it is cheaper this way. I don’t feel so good about it. But we are talking 
about 100 Euro all together, maximum. It is corruption. I have the reasons and 
excuses why I am doing it: it is mainly to help the organisation and because the 
laws and regulations are wrong. But the reason doesn’t matter, I am still using the 
organisation’s or the state’s property, so that’s why it is corruption. 
There are other cases inside our organisation. We have different committees, and 
the members sometimes volunteer to do certain tasks. It is good for me, because it 
reduces my work a bit.  We always have to do tricks with the invoices - that is 
quite normal, because the regulations are not flexible. One of the committee 
members asks for cash regularly in advance of completing his task. Last time he 
organised some catering. He provided an invoice in the end, but I am sure that he 
bought some food for himself. Another time he volunteered to provide some 
banners. He said he knows a good company, but he asked for the money in 
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advance. He presented invoices again, but I suspected something dodgy. I checked 
the prices of the banners online at the company and similar companies. There 
wasn’t much difference, but he said he can get it cheaper, so I suspect he kept 
some of the money. 
I didn’t mention it, because it wasn’t a lot of money, and I treated it as a payment 
for him, for his work. But I will keep following his affairs, I don’t really trust him. 
I shouldn’t let him to do it at all.  I feel bad about it, but I would say maximum 
20% abuse of the money is acceptable. 
The third case is proper corruption. There is a state fund for the sport federations 
and every civil organisation. The annual budget is based on this fund for most of 
the civil organisation. One year a man came to the office - he belongs to another 
sport federation - and he said that he can do the application for us. He also said 
that we won’t get the fund without his help. He asked 20% percent of the money 
what we would win for his service. I said no to his offer, he threatened us again, 
saying that we won’t see any of the money. We completed the application, and we 
won. I suppose he said the same for many other federations and I suppose that he 
got some positive answers. I think he got into trouble later, because he is no 
longer at that federation. I regret that I didn’t report this case. In the other cases I 
tried and I would always use an informal way. I would try, and I do try to discuss 
problems inside the organisation. The other reason for why I wouldn’t go public 
with the inner problems of the organisation is because it would influence the 
reputation of the federation and sport, and I would do more damage for the sport 
than for the people who deserve it." 
Author’s notes / Analysis 
Key highlights of the interview 
The interview highlights the problem of low salaries - hardly enough to make a 
living. Therefore the secretary has to find alternative ways to complement his 
salary from other resources. It also shows that in a similar way the secretary tries 
to complement the federation resources by using tricks and alternative solutions. 
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He has to bend the rules posited by the state. The inadequate state regulations, 
economic considerations and rationality motivate this action. It is particularly 
interesting to hear how the general secretary sets the rules in the social 
association.  
The key moments of the interview: 
1. Perception of corruption as a part of the culture  
It seems that there isn’t a unified view about the relationship between communism 
and wide-spread everyday corruption, but all the interviewees agreed that with the 
EU accession the situation regarding low-level corruption became worse. 
According to Istvan the openness for using informal ways instead of formal is a 
part of the Hungarian culture in two ways:  
(1) ‘If the formal way doesn’t work, don’t give up! There are informal ways to 
solve it.’ 
(2) ‘If the formal way is too difficult or expensive then use informal ways to solve 
it.’ 
This might be explained by the historical background of Hungary (as described in 
the historical outlook). Resistance against the oppressors and finding alternative 
solutions in legally plural situations and during economic shortages were the 
means to survive (for example during the 200-year Ottoman occupation and 50 
years under communism). As a legacy of the communist past, the 'uram-bátyám 
rendszer’, which is similar to the ‘blat’ system, still functions as an alternative 
solution.  
“If you can’t solve something first time, you have to look for someone who might 
know you in the organisation or someone who knows someone. ‘Do you have 
anybody who you are familiar with?’ This is the question to ask.”  
Istvan suggests that after the EU accession, because of the new regulations there 
was a positive change. However, the regulation made the legal system even more 
complex. Barber (2006) argues in his study about legal orders of the European 
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Union that the legal system is pluralist if it contains inconsistent rules of 
recognition that cannot be legally resolved from within the system. Because of the 
legally plural situation people started to act in an informal way. 
2. Taking part in corruption: reason and excuses and rationality 
Istvan says that when he takes part in corruption, he has two reasons and excuses: 
(1) he doesn’t earn enough so he is using informal transactions to contribute to his 
salary, (2) he also does it to ensure the better functioning of the organisation. 
Interestingly he states that a pay rise wouldn’t result in him engaging in less 
corruption. This notion is congruent with the findings of extensive research into 
police corruption conducted by criminologist Ferenc Krémer (1998). 
The state can’t guarantee enough salary for the people who work in public and 
state institutes such as hospitals, schools and sport organisations. In connection 
with that, Polese (2008) noted that in a society with informal economy and 
kinship networks, where the state fails to secure basic needs for citizens, informal 
economic transactions often make up for the inability of the state.  That is what 
Istvan is aware of - the state cannot guarantee a decent salary, but there are other 
ways.  
During an interview with a university teacher and PhD student I heard a similar 
excuse for taking part in corruption by abusing EU fund for research.  
“Corruption is negative, but necessary. If teachers would have higher salary and 
the researchers more grants, they would pay more attention to the research and to 
their job. The salaries are so low, but there is a golden pot - the EU funds. It is an 
easy way to get money. So it is necessary, because you simply don’t bring home 
enough money.” (University teacher and PhD student, 40-years old) 
Polese (2008) notes a similar situation in Ukraine in higher education - only the 
teachers in Ukraine complement their salary by accepting bribes before 
examinations. 
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3. Informal ways to regulate corruption 
An interesting part of the interview is how Istvan controls the informal economic 
practices in an informal way inside the organisation: 
(1) He is aware of other people’s practices, but he lets them get away with it and 
treats the 'cheated' money as a salary. (2) He would always choose informal ways 
over formal, in order to protect the integrity and the reputation of the organisation. 
It seems that he secures the maintenance of the organisation, and it flourishes with 
informal economic practices, but it does not mean that all the practices are 
allowed.  He doesn’t encourage informal practices, but he looks away - when it is 
small scale and he feels that the abuse of a certain amount of money is legitimate 
as a salary contribution. If he wouldn’t control the practices in this way, it would 
be even more widespread and those practices wouldn’t necessarily help the 
organisation. When he lets people abuse the organisation’s money, he sets the 
social association's own rules inside the formal organisation. His connection with 
the committee members is personal. Lomnitz (1988) showed that informal 
activities based on personal connections constituted a system of exchange based 
on interpersonal trust and loyalty that runs underneath and parallel to the formal 
administrative rules. Istvan built up his trust-based network within the formal 
organisation itself. 
Istvan has to control the informal trust-based network, and set the rules.  He treats 
20% abuse of the organisation's money as salary, but over 20% is not acceptable. 
There is no written rule that determines the 20%, but he clearly connects an 
emotion to the abuse of over 20%. Putting this into the context of Ehrlich's 
'opinion necessitatis', the norms of living law are unique in that the emotive 
reaction it evoked in people for its violation is revolt. The fact that he looks away 
when 20% or less of the money was abused provides a reference point to the 
individual members of the social association and tells them not only what conduct 
is expected of them, but that also tells them, in relative terms, what they can 
expect from others. Ziegert (2013) describes this as a ‘reflexive web of normative 
expectations’ - which constitutes the domain of law. 
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4. Moral dilemma 
When he mentions the case with the EU fund, he calls it 'proper corruption', 
implying that the previous cases were just 'corruption-like' activities. 
Contradicting this, he is aware that all the other activities which are perceived 
negatively are corrupt, but they are necessary, and that is why they are different. 
When he is engaged in corruption he does it for the organisation, although he 
doesn’t think that it legitimises the corrupt act. This shows the difficulties when 
establishing a formal or even informal definition of corruption. Istvan’s moral 
dilemma is most visible around the Christmas dinner. He is listing reasons to 
legitimise his corrupt action, which is similar to what Humphrey described in the 
Russia. Humphrey (2002) argues in his paper that activities which are traditionally 
understood as corruption or bribery were found by many respondents to be 
legitimate and appropriate behaviour and not perceived as corrupt. In other cases 
people saw the appropriateness of their behaviour but they obeyed much stronger 
social forces that somewhat legitimised or at least made the act ethically neutral 
(Humphrey, 2002). 
8.2.3. Local government  
Interview 3 
Kalman, Local government member and ex-mayor (56 year-old): ”If you are 
in the power you don’t have to find opportunities, the hardest part is to say no to 
all kinds of opportunities” 
"I don’t think that there was any corruption during communism, because the 
people had nothing to give. If there were favours they based mostly on whether 
you were member of the party or not. There was nepotism, but I wouldn’t call it 
corruption. Especially in the countryside, we didn’t notice much, we had just 
nothing. So I think the everyday corruption started after communism, because the 
salaries were still low, but you could actually buy goods. The EU has many 
regulations, but I think it has no effect on Hungary at all. I mean normal people 
don’t even feel whether they are part of the EU or not. It is just nothing, except for 
the EU funds. There are some dubious cases around the funds, but there is a 
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problem with the laws, and the system. You can never apply for the fund that you 
need, so you have to apply for something else, and cheat. 
I have never taken part in corruption personally, but it affected my life when I 
didn’t want to take part. That is why I lost my chair as a mayor, so in this way it 
affects my life. I care about the town and I care about the people, but I don’t care 
about politics and power. I just wanted to do everything legally and to improve 
the town, not just stick with the old system. I wanted to make the system more 
efficient. 
I could take part in corrupt activities when I was the mayor, and it is not even 
difficult, because there are many offers. If you are in power you don’t have to find 
opportunities, the hardest part is to say no to all kind of opportunities. I think the 
council members can be corrupt as well: sometimes it is hard to understand how 
they vote and what they vote. Sometimes you can suspect that there was 
something in the background. 
When I become the mayor, people started to act differently. I was just a normal 
citizen before. My wife is a teacher, I have a teacher's qualification as well, but I 
worked as a librarian and I was the leader of the local historical society. I don’t 
care a lot about power, so I didn’t expect people to act differently towards me, but 
they did. Some of them felt frightened and didn’t want to speak about normal 
things. Other people started to become aggressive and claimed that I should do 
this and that for them and the village. In the beginning I tried to listen to 
everyone’s complains, but it was very over-whelming. I couldn’t help and satisfy 
everyone, so some people became angry. 
I got some invitations for corruption. I ordered some new flowers for the town 
gardens. I just used the same place as my predecessor, because that seemed quite 
fine. When they did the delivery, the delivery man said that there are a couple of 
flowers for me, and asked me where he should put them. I didn’t understand at 
first: did he mean for me, personally? I said that I didn’t order any so he should 
take them back. He said he can’t do that and left them. I didn’t want to take them 
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home so I gave them to the office workers. I told them they are free to take. It 
made me wonder why I got the flowers. It could have been a friendly gesture, 
designed to make sure that we order from them next time. The worst case is that 
the previous mayor had some kind of deal with them. So they thought that the deal 
hadn’t change. Anyway, I was satisfied with their delivery and I ordered from 
them next time and they didn’t send any extra flowers. 
A more serious case, which basically costs me my position, is the following. You 
can say that we are a tourist town, especially during the summer. There are 4-5 
restaurants, pubs and buffet on the main square, which is the most frequented 
place. These establishments are owned by three people, and they have some other 
establishments around the town. They do not own the buildings - they are the 
town’s property. I found out that they had a contract with the town, which meant 
that they were able to rent the buildings quite cheap. It was an old contract (6 
years-old). The revision of the contract was due in the end of my term - if we were 
satisfied with their work we could contract them for another 6 years. I wanted to 
make the competition procedure public, so other entrepreneurs could bid for the 
places, or at least the old contractors should show some work and effort to keep 
the places. Interestingly, everyone was against me in this case -the contractors 
obviously, the council members, and some of the citizens as well. The 
entrepreneurs took it for granted that the place was theirs, and the citizens said 
that they don’t want foreign people - that I should support the locals. I talked with 
the entrepreneurs personally and I said they have to understand that they have to 
take part in the new bidding competition. After that they started a campaign 
against me. There were some nasty accusations and conversations on the internet 
and in the local newspaper. Then the election came, and I lost by a couple of votes 
and I had to leave. 
While I was the mayor I applied for many funds, and I controlled the expenditure 
and the reserves, so when I stopped being a mayor the village had 90 million Ft. 
After I resigned as mayor I stayed on as a council member, and in this way I could 
still have some overview of the village’s financial records. In most cases the 
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council has to vote about projects and expenditure, it is not only the mayor’s 
decision. Shortly after I left the new mayor made two decisions, one without the 
council, and another formally with the council, but legally without. In the first 
case he ordered a closed meeting, because of “trade secrets”. This meeting was 
about the prolongation of the entrepreneurs’ contracts. When I looked into the 
new contract I learnt that the entrepreneurs had to pay less than before. As I 
mentioned, when I left the post as a mayor the town had 90million Ft. In the first 
month the mayor decided that the town needed to re-decorate the square where the 
restaurants and pubs are - and the project would cost 45million Ft. The council 
had to make a decision about it. The mayor couldn’t provide a detailed plan of 
costs and constructions. But the council voted yes. I don’t understand how it could 
happen. I asked to look into the detailed financial plan of the construction, but as 
the other council member voted yes, I couldn't do a lot. I don’t really know where 
to report. 
Of course I am aware of where I could report officially, at the Ombudsman, but I 
have a personal experience with him. We invited the Ombudsman for the opening 
of the new library, so I was talking with him and with the other politicians who 
came with him. I didn’t feel that he would do anything, he is just the same 
political person.  
I would rather do it in an informal way. I would talk with people in the town, also 
I could write in the local newspaper, and there is live broadcasting of the council 
meetings in the local television. But last time when there was some argument at 
the council meeting they just stopped the cameras. Now the new mayor controls 
the whole media, so there is not a lot that I can do. I am also afraid. It is a small 
town, everybody knows me. I don’t want to be the bad guy. I am afraid that 
someday someone will damage my car or so on. I have spoken up in the council, 
because I know the financial records of the town, and I know that we could spend 
that 45 million Ft in a better way, for example developing the school, or pensioner 
home, not to make the rich entrepreneur even richer. I just want to develop the 
town. 
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I would report if it is something very big, and against the town's development, 
then I couldn’t let it go.  This 45-million Ft project should be big enough, but I 
don’t have any proof. On paper it will be all fine, and it was the council's decision. 
Whether they offered something to the council members for voting yes is another 
question. I don’t feel safe. I would risk my position in the society. I have already 
lost some friends. 
Author’s notes / Analysis 
The key highlights of the interview 
Kalman refuses to enter into, and obey the norms of the social association, he only 
wants to accept the state law, which is unacceptable for the locals. This interview 
provided an insight into corruption’s hidden connection’s with local moral codes. 
The key moments from the interview 
1. General perception of corruption 
Kalman's perception of corruption during and after the fall of communism is 
congruent with that of the primary school teacher. They are the same age, and 
they both lived during communism, which is a possible explanation for the similar 
opinion. However, it is possible to indentify the following differences (1) 
According to Kalman the EU accession has had no effect on people’s everyday 
life. (2) Kalman suggests that there was no corruption during communism (3) He 
also indicates that Budapest citizens and people from the countryside might have a 
different perception of informal transactions.  
2. The cost of only obeying the state law 
In opposition to Istvan’s opinion in the previous section (“whoever claims that he 
or she never took part in corruption is lying”), Kalman states that he was in many 
situation when he had to refuse corruption, but he never took part in it. The fact 
that he lost his post as a mayor supports this statement. He failed to notice the 
inner ordering of the social association in which he became an important figure as 
the mayor. To support this argument I will use the interview to make a list of 
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where the norms of the social association became visible how they differed from 
the state law. 
(1) Kalman was disturbed by the people’s different behaviour towards him when 
he became mayor. Some people were frightened, and some got aggressive, but he 
just wanted to listen to all the complaints. He couldn’t help everybody, which 
made him feel exhausted, and the local community wasn’t satisfied with him - 
they felt he did not want to help, while he just wanted to keep to the formal ways. 
(2) The case with the flowers revealed a possible ‘uram-bátyám’ relationship 
between the ex-mayor and the flower provider. The favour and bribe wasn’t 
attached to the mayor as a person, but to the position. This action was not a simple 
attempt to bribe. In connection with this, Ledeneva (1989) notes that in post-
communist countries it is possible to distinguish a long-term economic 
relationship (called ‘blat’) from transactions with a character of immediate 
reciprocity for a bribe. 
(3) The same ‘uram-bátyám’ long term relationship appears in connection with 
the local entrepreneurs (restaurant owners). They considered the mayor's legally 
and rationally supported suggestion to announce a competition procedure for 
renting out the restaurant buildings as a personal attack. They reacted the same 
way by personally attacking the mayor instead of initiating a consultation or 
taking part in the competition. 
(4) Kalman mentions that sometimes he does not understand the reasons and 
rationality behind the council members’ voting. He has different morals and views 
to the rest of the council members. However it seems that the mayor’s ‘attack’ 
against the local restaurant owners evoked an emotive reaction in the other 
council members as a violation of the norms of living law in the local community. 
Ehrlich (2002) suggested that people in communal relationships perform their 
duties whilst creating their own rules. Small municipalities in Hungary can be 
seen as communal relationship. In 2012, the State Audit Office (SAO) published a 
report on the deficiencies of internal audits at local government level in small 
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entities, based on a pilot involving 12 municipalities. The most frequent 
deficiencies were: lack of internal regulations, lack of definitions regarding 
powers and responsibilities, unregulated communication with external partners 
and lack of hierarchical management information system (EU anti-corruption 
report 2013). Some municipalities have adopted ethical codes, which mostly 
provide general guideline on fair treatment of clients without necessarily covering 
practical rules on gifts or favours (EU anti-corruption report, 2013).  This shows 
that on local government level there are no strict regulations in place. The mayor 
has to learn and obey the rules of social association because that is the expected 
behaviour. 
The way he lost his position, and how his behaviour was perceived by the local 
people, is similar to the situation described by Urinboyev and Svensson (2013) in 
connection with the ‘mahalla’11 in rural Uzbekistan. They describe the case of two 
state officials who are centre of the ‘everyday mahalla talk’. “Sardor is a high 
level state official, while Rahmon is a district-level traffic policeman (low-level 
official). However, in everyday mahalla life, Sardor, despite having such a high 
official status did not have a decent reputation and was often described as a 
communist, a term that carries negative meaning and is used in relation to law-
abiding state officials who do not share their political influence and resources with 
their kin and mahalla. As a high-level state official, Sardor had power and he 
could easily divert the resources to mahalla, but he always rejected the request of 
mahalla and asked them to solve their problems through formal channels. Because 
of his attempts to keep his public office separate from the private sphere Sardor 
was regarded as a communist in the words of many mahalla residents they 
encountered, while Rahmon who engaged in informal transactions was a man of 
respect” (Urinboyev & Svensson, 2013:378). 
                                                          
11
  Before the establishment of the Soviet rule in Uzbekistan, mahallas fulfilled local self-
government functions connecting private sphere with public sphere. An informal council 
of elders (oqsoqol, or aksakal) provided leadership. 
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3. Formal and informal reporting 
(1) As a local government member he tried the formal way for reporting and 
speaking up against the debatable actions of the new mayor and other local 
government members, but soon he realised the formal ways do not work (because 
they ordered close meetings, and they cut off the live TV broadcast). He tried 
informal ways, talking with the local citizens. 
(2) His scepticism against the Ombudsman and his activity is interesting, because 
Kalman is admittedly idealistic. But he sees no point in reporting formally, and he 
regards the Ombudsman as a 'political person'.   
(3) In his case the formal reporting and the fight against corrupt practices, or at 
least not engaging in them, did not only cost him his post as mayor, but his status 
in the society, and the village’s local hierarchy. Sadly Kalman felt physically 
frightened as well - when he mentioned that he doesn’t want someone to damage 
his car. 
8.2.4. The external actors’ opinion 
Interview 4 
Miklos Ligeti, Transparency International 
"In connection with motivating formal reporting of wrongdoings we have been 
trying for a long time (10 years) to establish protection for whistleblowers. The 
TI’s Hungarian chapter already employs some tools and forums where the 
whistleblowers can seek help (legal advice mostly) and has persuaded the 
government to implement the whistleblowing protection law (2013:CLXV). 
Although the law and the legislation appear to be formally acceptable, there is no 
instrumental background to achieve the protection. We have an active relationship 
with the British chapter and we gained an insight into their practices through 
working together. This revealed an enormous gap between the EU-standard 
whistle blowing system and legislation and the so-called whistleblower protection 
(laws and systems which are employed in Hungary). Whistleblowing is an Anglo-
Saxon institute born in the normative order of Western Europe, and I think it only 
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really works in that cultures. Still, we haven’t given up on establishing EU 
standard whistleblowing and whistleblowers’ protection in Hungary. But we had 
to transform the institute to make it suitable for the circumstances, and the 
Hungarian legal and normative order. I don’t believe that Hungarians are morally 
inferior. The society is simply not ready to overcome of the fear and negative 
feelings connected to speaking up.  
Regarding whistleblowing, there is a double-layer problem in Hungary: the 
society as a whole doesn’t support reporting and the actual legislation doesn’t 
work. The regulation for whistleblowers only functions to legitimise the state 
power and also serves to provide EU conformity, but there is no real intent behind 
the words. It is clearly visible from the case of Andras Horvath, when instead of 
protecting the whistleblower and investigation, the state instituted legal 
proceedings against him.
12
 Realising that we can’t expect any real protection from 
the whistleblowing law, we have decided to work together with our partner 
organisations and we just launched a new whistleblowing program. Our intention 
is to provide publicity, legal and - if it is necessary and appropriate - financial 
support for the whistleblowers. 
Laszlo Szekely, Ombudsman 
(This material was collected from a conference on the evaluation of 
whistleblowing legislation, 2015 May) 
In the last year we received 410 whistleblowing statements. In 70% of the cases 
the whistleblower requested anonymity. This high rate shows that the people are 
scared of the consequences. We were afraid when we launched the project that we 
would receive a high number of reports, but the data refutes the stereotype that the 
Hungarian nation is an informer nation. Only 40% of the reports fit the criteria as 
being legally grounded. 
                                                          
12
 Former tax administration (NAV) employee Andras Horvath went public claiming that 
the reluctance of the NAV to uncover VAT fraud arbitrarily favours some businesses and 
results in hundreds of billions of forint losses of revenue each year. 
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Fanny Hidvegi, TASZ (Society for the Civil Rights) 
The current regulation doesn’t protect the whistleblowers, so our civil 
organisation suggests to people who seek help to not submit a report because 
currently there isn’t any institute in practice which would protect them from 
retaliation. In theory retaliation of any kind should not happen, but in practice, if it 
happens there are no negative effects for the retaliator. The law also doesn’t 
protect the whitleblowers if they want publicity, for example talking with the 
press, and also they don’t get exemption from the obligation of confidentiality.  
Author’s note / Analysis 
It is important to emphasise the differences between the national legislation of 
whistleblowing in EU countries and the concepts and tools employed by 
Transparency International. The national chapters of the TI have been involved in 
shaping the new law in many EU countries including Hungary. The British 
whistleblowing legislation (the Public Interest Disclosure Act, 1998) is the first 
and best act of this kind in the EU (EU Anti-Corruption Report, 2014) and it 
serves as an example of good practice for other member states. Therefore a 
comparison between the Hungarian and British national legislation can highlight 
the difficulties. In Hungary the new law on whistleblowing was adopted in 
October 2013. It aims to ensure safeguards of confidentiality of reporting and the 
protection of whistleblowers from any negative consequences of their action. The 
British act contains a prohibition on penalising workers who make protected 
disclosures and a wide definition of ‘worker’ to include employees, contractors, 
agency workers and work experience students. Hungarian law doesn’t define who 
can submit a report, and it clearly doesn’t define whistleblowers as workers. It can 
be seen as a positive thing - because in this way the protection is not limited to a 
certain group - but in practise it makes the legislation vague and results in the 
misunderstanding of the institutes’ function that I will describe later. The British 
act also lists a broad range of ‘relevant wrongdoings’ which can be reported 
including criminal offences, breaches of legal obligations, threats to health and 
safety or the environment, miscarriages of justice, improper use of public funds or 
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any attempt to conceal information in relation to such wrongdoings. The 
Hungarian legislation only provides a vague definition about what can be 
reported, and the same act also regulates another legal instrument – complaints - 
which can cause confusion. The biggest shortcoming of the Hungarian legislation 
is that whistleblowers are not protected from procedures against them in case they 
reveal professional or commercial secrets. Finally, the British act employs a 
‘stepped disclosure system’ which encourages workers to report to employers in 
the first instance. According to the Hungarian legislation, the whistleblower 
should submit the reports to the Ombudsman, which once again provides another 
confusing situation as the Ombudsman already has a similar role dealing with 
complains. For an average citizen it is difficult to decide, without exact 
definitions, whether he should submit a report or a complaint. Before the 
ratification of the act, the Hungarian TI submitted a critique which consisted of 21 
objections and a detailed suggestion of how the legislation could approximate the 
EU standard whistleblowing laws. The act was ratified without changes. 
According to the law, the Ombudsman’s homepage should contain a short 
summary of whistleblowers reports and the decisions made.  Since the set up of 
the system, only two hundred and fifteen cases have been published, and only a 
few would be labelled as whistleblowing according to EU standards. Half of the 
cases were rejected because the report wasn’t whistleblowing, or because the 
whistleblower wasn’t identified. 
9. Conclusion 
 
In this paper I addressed questions about the persistency of low-level corruption in 
post-communist Hungary. I was interested in the reasons why people continue to 
pay bribes. I wanted to explore the reasons behind the low frequency of formally 
reported petty corruption cases, and also under what circumstance people do 
report wrongdoings. I made an attempt to find the difference between the legal 
definition and informal definition of corruption (as it is perceived by members of 
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society). And finally, to ensure the completeness of the thesis I addressed 
questions about how the problem of wide-spread petty corruption and the low  
level of officially reported petty corruption cases is perceived by external actors 
(such as anti-corruption organisations and the government / relevant ministries), 
and to what extent this perception is reflected in their policies. 
General perception of corruption after the system transition and EU accession 
The perception of corruption during communism is dependent on whether the 
interviewee actually lived during that period, or just learnt about it at school, or 
heard about it from their parents and grandparents. It is also dependant on the 
informant current political view. A typical view of communism of the younger 
generation with political influences is the following: “It is hard to change in such 
a short period after 47-years of communism, which built on the corruption. The 
people who were born after the system transition are only 25 years old, but I think 
that when they grow up, and they will be in a position where they can make 
decisions then there will be some changes. But maybe the changes will appear 
only after one more generation. Communism destroyed the middle-class and civil 
intellectuals and it is hard to build it up.” (26-year old female doctor). However, 
all generations and people with different political views agree that after the EU 
accession the situation worsened, especially because of the EU funds and the 
inadequate application system, implementation and control of those. There are 
difficulties with the implementation of the EU anti-corruption policy as well. 
Even where anti-corruption institutions and legislation are in place, the 
enforcement is often insufficient in practice. This reflects a lack of firm political 
commitment on the part of leaders and decision-makers to combat corruption in 
all its forms, including petty corruption (Dimitrova, 2010). My findings support 
the idea that after the fall of the communist system, the phenomenon of petty 
corruption persisted and even proliferated in these societies (Holmes, 1997), and it 
is possible to argue that after the EU accession this proliferation continued. Most 
of the interviewees thought that although democratisation is in process, Hungary 
needs a much longer time and a generational change to forget communism and 
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build up a democratic state and society. It seems that people are open for the 
change. There was an open vote about the EU accession and people had high 
hopes after 2004. The democratisation is still in process. 
The reasons to take part in informal transactions 
Based on the interviews I could identify four main reasons to take part in informal 
transactions. The interviewees referred to these practices sometimes as excuses or 
reasons depending on the person’s perception of the coercive grade of the 
situation (for example when they could identify a legal, but inefficient or more 
difficult, way to act they referred to the informal transaction as an excuse). It is 
necessary to emphasise that in this thesis I am not suggesting that these are the 
only reasons, rather I try to complement the literature and the previous research’s 
findings in the same areas. The reasons differ at a systemic level. By making a 
distinction between systemic levels I try to achieve a more operational way of 
understanding the problem. Before explaining the systemic levels I have to note 
that there is always a subjective element: for example as the interviews revealed it 
is relative that the interviewee considers a low salary enough of a reason or excuse 
for corruption. It is possible to distinguish two types of reasons: structural and 
individualistic. Structural reasons occur when the state’s shortcomings in one or 
more areas (legal or economical) generate a situation for corruption (the 
interviews revealed low salaries and inadequate legislation as examples of 
shortcomings). Although, when there is a political will (and resources) these 
problems could be solved at a structural level. The second type are the perceptive 
or individualistic reasons - when the interviewees do not consider their act with 
regards to a legal/illegal perspective (according to state law), they follow their 
own or the institute’s moral codes. 
Structural reasons 
1. Low salary: Every interviewee mentioned that their salary is too low and that 
they have to complement it, which they achieve through informal economic 
practices, often using the institute's or state's resources. Polese’s (2008) findings 
in post-Soviet Ukraine revealed similarities between the Ukrainian and Hungarian 
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education and police sectors and Rivkin-Fish’s (2005) research highlighted 
similarities between the health-care sectors in Hungary and Russia. However, 
there wasn’t agreement between the interviewees about whether a pay rise would 
result in less frequent engagement in corrupt practices, or whether it would result 
only in higher living standards and bigger demands. Hungary has the second 
lowest minimal salary in the EU
13
. 
2. 'I have no choice, because the regulations are wrong’: Most of the  interviewees 
mentioned problems with the regulations, either in connection with the state law 
or even the formal norms of the institute. Some laws don’t follow the rationality 
of economics, or make the situation complicated or even impossible. In these 
situations it is easier and more profitable to follow the informal norms of the 
institute or the best economical solution. The inadequate regulation can be 
explained by the shortcomings of the transition legislation, and also by the legally 
plural situation which is the result of the EU accession (Barber, 2006). 
Perceptive or individualistic  reasons 
3. ‘I am pressured by my superior or the institute’: It was mentioned by several 
interviewees that because their superior was involved, they didn’t have much 
choice other than to collaborate if they wanted to keep their job, or if they wanted 
to be successful in the job. Jancsics (2014) identified a similar imperative for 
engaging corruption, which is ’ordered to be corrupt’. This imperative differs 
from my findings, because many of the interviewees realised that their superior 
engaged in informal transactions either to support the institute, or to guarantee 
working places and financial resources - this made them consider the corrupt 
practices to be at best acceptable, or at least made them looking away when it was 
happening. The superior’s behaviour provides a reference point to the individual 
member of the social association and tells them not only what conduct is expected 
of them, but that also tells them, in relative terms, what they can expect from 
                                                          
13
 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Minimum_wage_statistics/hu
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others. Ziegert (2013) describes this as a ‘reflexive web of normative 
expectations’ - which constitutes the domain of law. 
4. Just go with the flow: People mostly just don’t think about whether their 
transaction is corrupt or not. In the interview I asked the participants to think 
about the transactions and the terms 'corrupt', 'illegal', 'informal' and 'immoral'. It 
was interesting that some of them realised in front of me that what he or she had 
done might be against the state laws, because most of their transactions were on 
such a small scale that they couldn’t hurt anyone. This is congruent with 
Rumyantseva’s (2005) findings in Uzbekistan where some of interviewees 
believed that a little corruption does not hurt anyone. The interviewees noted that 
some small-scale corruption wouldn’t cause damage for anyone, only for the state 
and the EU. But as I learnt: ”If you steal from the state, it is not stealing really - 
cheating with taxes and public and private procurement “mutyi” is a national 
sport in Hungary” (32-year old, PhD student).  
I have to mention the survival tactic (as it is presented in the literature of post-
comminist societies (Ledeneva, 1989, Karklins, 2002)) as a reason. I think there is 
no need to define this as a separate reason if we look the four listed above - each 
of these describes a situation and a society where people can’t live without 
engaging and initiating informal practices - because they will 'lose the game'.  I 
found that the ’uram-bátyám’ or ’blat’ system still functions as an alternative to 
when the legal way does not work. 
The reasons behind why people don’t report formally: 
1. 'Where to report?’: This was the question that they asked the most. There was 
no institution where they could report and feel safe. Also, when they report they 
should provide evidence such as documents, videos or audio footages.  
2. ‘Even if I would report something, nothing would happen’: There is very little 
trust in the authorities and police. Sadly, the Ombudsman appears to be a 'political 
person' (i.e. he is influenced by political considerations rather than being truly 
independent as he should be). 
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3. They fear the consequences: They don’t only fear the direct or personal 
consequences, but also that their report might damage the reputation of the 
institute - and even that indirectly they might lose their job. It is better to have a 
low salary and a safe job where they can complement their salary in an informal 
way, rather than to have no job. 
The low frequency of formal reporting doesn’t mean that the people do not try to 
complain or solve their problem in an informal way. Every interviewee described 
which methods they used to be heard or how they tried to control other people's 
informal practices to keep the corruption under control. The form of the informal 
report or interference depends on the unwritten rules of the organisation, the 
social group or the local moral codes. The existence of the informal way show 
similarites to Ehrlich's 'opinion necessitatis', where he suggests that the norms of 
living law are unique in that the emotive reaction it evoked in people for its 
violation is revolt (Tervino, 2013). The following is a good example from a 
university teacher (32-year old) - “If you confront the leaders directly it is not a 
very good idea and we don’t really dare to do it. I am using informal channels, for 
example there is an opinion box or you can make some well directed comments or 
hints to the department administrator, who knows all the gossip.” 
However, people would report. It depends on their position, because if they are 
higher up in the organisational hierarchy, it is easier to report. They wouldn’t 
report after they left the organisation, because they wouldn’t be interested or 
affected by the wrong-doing any more.  The reported case should be something 
which (1) includes a big amount of money or is extremely immoral, or (2) would 
affect the organisation’s reputation, or the people inside the organisation's 
reputation, very badly, and (3) they have enough evidence to prove the wrong-
doing, and (4) they would feel protected. It definitely doesn’t include any personal 
reasons.  This description of what they would report is promising, because it is 
mostly covered by the TI’s definition of whistleblowing. Most of them stated that 
they think there will be a time when they will have enough evidence and they will 
speak up.  
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The informal definition of corruption 
The legal definition of corruption in the Hungarian context is situated in the Code 
of Punishment (2012:C). The Penal Code does not provide a general definition of 
corruption, instead it lists a statutory definition of activities which are considered 
as corruption such as bribery, state official bribery, bribery in judicial or 
administrative procedure and profiteering with influence (2012:C 290-300§). 
Every offence has an active and a passive form, such as initiating bribery and 
accepting bribery. The National Anti-Corruption Strategy (2015-2018) also refers 
to the definition of corruption as it is defined in the Penal Code as a collection of 
illegal activities. The rules of penal codes are only fully interpretable by looking 
into the court practice and judgements, which are a crucial part of the legal 
system. The so-called justifications of the Penal Code and the commentary which 
is based on the judicial practice also help to understand the concept. Providing an 
example, the judicial decisions and the commentary address questions such as if 
the money was given after the service, is that considered as corruption? (BH 2004. 
6) (This is congruent with the debate about the legality of ‘thank-you money’ 
which was described earlier). The Code of Punishment (1978: IV) was re-written 
in 2012 and in the case of corruption some of the statutory definitions were 
modified, meaning that some of the old judicial decisions are invalid. The 
commentary suggests that some of the corrupt practices do not comply with the 
strict statutory definition - these are considered as not strictly corruption cases, 
however they contains relevant elements.  
A detailed description of all statutory definitions and judicial law would exceed 
the limitation of this research. Therefore firstly the informal definition of 
corruption will be presented as it was revealed by the interviewees. Secondly, I 
will compare the legal definition to the key elements of the informal definition. 
Based on the interviews the definition of corruption should include the following: 
1. The abuse of property of the state or the institution, or of EU funds.  
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2. Corruption as an act is by definition unnecessary. This means that it is not part 
of ‘survival tactics’ - it is more to complement low salary levels. 
3. Corrupt acts are voluntary - they come from a free-will decision. The actor is 
not forced by circumstances, superiors or the organisation. 
4.  A significant amount of money is involved.  
5. The act could damage the institute’s reputation or affect other people in the 
organisation. 
The legal definition in relation to the formal definition: 
(1) It is congruent with the legal definition, which also includes international 
organisations, treaties. 
(2) The legal definition does not consider situations when corruption is necessary, 
however the judicial practice would consider the motive of the act. This might 
result in limiting the sentence, which is in general 3-5 years imprisonment.  
(3) The coercive power which comes from the organisation or superior would 
nullify the fact of law, but in the informal definition it is only based on perception 
not real coercivity. 
(4) The law considers not only significant amounts, but any amount of money, 
and also inexpensive objects, favours or even food which are not customary gifts 
if given with the purpose of initiating a corrupt act. 
From the interviews it became clear what the interviewees regarded as ‘real’ or 
‘proper’ corruption, and what they regarded as only ‘ tricks’, ‘survival tactics’ or 
‘must do’. The distinction between the different types of corruption - necessary or 
pure greed - indicates the existence of a dual morality in bribery and reveals the 
multi-faceted meaning and morality of informal transactions. The distinction, and 
the interviewees emotional reasoning, reminds us of Ehrlich’s 'Opinio 
necessitatis', where he suggest that the legal norm of living law was unique in that 
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the emotive reaction it evoked in people for its violation is revolt (Trevino, 
2013:8.). 
The external actors’ opinion and their policy: 
The quote from the Ombudsman clearly shows that he does not (or rather does not 
want to) understand the function of whistleblowing. His statements and reasoning 
are also contradictory as the reason for the low number of reports might be the 
fear of the retaliation. The whistleblowing doesn’t encourage ‘informers’, only 
people who act for the public interest. The state agency is also satisfied with the 
low number of reports, when the target should be achieving a high number. The 
state agency's opinion and approach appears clearly in their policy and 
functioning: as long as the institute exists and in some functional aspects satisfies 
EU conformity, their job was successful. As we learned, the TI won't give up on 
the fight for the protection of whistleblowers - they try to adapt their policies to 
the normative and legal orders and the needs of society. Realising that they can’t 
trust the state institute and legislation to achieve the protection for whistleblowers, 
they try to guarantee publicity for the whistleblowers and legal protection 
supported by legal experts.  They also maintain a conversation with the ministries 
and state offices, because the full protection for whistleblowers can only be 
achieved if it is supported and guaranteed by state law. 
Contribution to the categorisation of petty corruption in Hungary 
Karklins (2002) suggests that post-communist corruption has many sub-types, 
some of which are institutionalised: corruption is rooted in systemic features of 
the communist system and the transition from them. David Jancsics, Hungarian 
organisation sociologist, conducted extensive research on the subject of low-level 
corruption in Hungary (between December 2009 and May 2011). Based on the 
fieldwork, which comprised around fifty in-depth interviews, he presented his 
findings in three research papers (2013, 2014) in which he explored different 
aspects of the same phenomenon. 
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After the data analysis I recognised the importance of the categorisation of corrupt 
acts in order to understand the reasons behind the persistency of low-level 
corruption in Hungary. I also recognised that instead of making new categories, I 
could contribute to the existing categories. I now present the categories 
established by Jancsics along with my contribution to the categorisation. Firstly, 
Jancsics (2014) identified imperatives in informal resource exchanges. He 
established two main categories: the macro-level imperatives and the 
organisational-level imperatives. He argued that the organisational-level 
imperatives can be found in all society, while the macro-level imperatives are 
special in post-communist countries' social settings. Within the macro-level 
imperatives he made two sub-categories: universalistic norms - which can be seen 
as norms in the whole society - and material structural imperatives - which are 
more individualistic. Inside the universalistic norms, there are two more 
distinctions, which Jancsics calls: ‘consume more’ - referring to the situation after 
the fall of communism when it became possible to buy more goods - and the 
‘Robin Hood attitude’ - which legitimises stealing from the state or the abuse of 
the state property. The material structural imperatives are: ’I cannot afford to 
violate the rules’ - which can refer to low salaries - and the dysfunctional post-
socialist institutions - which represents the problem with the regulations, and also 
with the institutions. The organisational-level imperatives can be pluralistic norms 
- such as the rule ‘do not turn on an in-group mate’ - or material hierarchical 
imperatives. The latter can be the imperatives of gatekeepers 
14
 or ‘ordered to be 
corrupt’. During the analysis I could identify these categories in my collected 
data. However, my approach differs to that of Jancsics - I used living law theory 
and legal pluralism as the driving theories. I considered the organisations (primary 
school, sport organisation, local government) as ‘social associations’ as described 
                                                          
14
  The literature tends to distinguish between two types of corrupt practices: 
collusion and extortion (Mishra, 2006) In case of extortion the agent uses his or her 
authority to force the client to pay a bribe.
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by Ehrlich (2002) as a plurality of human beings who, in their relationships with 
one another, recognise certain rules of conduct as binding, and, generally at least, 
actually regulate their conduct according to them. I found living law imperatives 
beside the two main groups listed by Jancsics (macro-level and organisational-
level). Therefore I suggest adding so-called living law imperatives (horizontally) 
next to macro-level and organisational-level imperatives. These living law 
imperatives are based on the causes of taking part in informal transactions that I 
have described above. I would not identify 'low salaries' as a living law 
imperative, but 'wrong regulations' as a structural factor provide a possibility for 
living law imperatives to emerge alongside individualistic factors:  
1. Wrong regulations - contradictory regulations, laws without precedents or 
institutional background and laws which don’t consider the rationality of 
economics generate rules which are not ratified by the state law, but which 
actually work as a tool to overcome impossible legal situations. In this case the 
facts of living law have a greater impact on the situation than the law posited by 
the state (Ehrlich, 2002). 
2. ‘Just go with the flow’ - In this case the person doesn’t recognise the act as 
illicit, because it is so ingrained as an everyday informal transaction. These 
suggest on the one hand a dual morality regarding informal transactions, and on 
the other hand rules which could be said to have evolved spontaneously out of 
social life, and that there is an inner ordering of the associations (Ehrlich, 2002). 
3. ‘I do it because I am pressured by the institute or by my superior’ - This differs 
from Jancsics’s organisational-level category in that there is no direct order from 
the superior, but the superior sets the rules which differ from the state’s and the 
organisation’s formal rules. Ziegert (2013) describes this as a ‘reflexive web of 
normative expectations’ - which constitutes the domain of law. 
I found that none of the corrupt situations can be described by only one of the 
imperatives - they are always the combination of two or more. However, it is 
possible to identify the main driving forces.  
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In another research paper Jancsics (2013) explored the relationship between the 
client and the corrupt actor. He separated two different types of cases: when the 
client and actor do not have a prior relationship - i.e. external factors dominate - 
and cases with stronger social ties between actors and client - here there is more 
freedom to structure the relationship. He also analysed the exchange structure of 
low-level corruption, and found that often a third actor is involved. He calls it 
brokerage, and identified five types: representative, entrepreneur, gatekeeper, 
extra services and multiple inside brokerage. Jancsics (2014) also differentiates by 
the participant’s social status (based on their education and occupation): elite, 
middle class, entrepreneur, working class (no college degree, manual workers, 
low-level administrative) and lower working class. Every interviewee who took 
part in my research was middle class. 
Based on the collected data and the analysis I would suggest adding the following 
categories vertically: 
1. The actors' perception of the corrupt act, which can be negative, positive or 
necessary, or a combination of two of these. 
2. The main reasons why people remain silent when they notice wrong-doing (in 
this case a corrupt act). This can be divided into: inadequate legislation, fear of 
retaliation, ‘I don’t know where to report’ and lack of trust in the institutions and 
in the legal system.  
3. If people do report or speak up against corruption, in what form are they doing 
that? In an official way or an informal way? 
These categories are important if we try to understand the complexity and the 
reasons behind low-level corruption in post-communist countries. Also, in future 
research we can trace and use these patterns. 
The table in Appendix IV contains Jancsics’ categorisation of low-level 
corruption as it appears in the different research papers complemented by my 
suggested categories. 
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10. Final Remarks 
 
The democratic transition after 1990 triggered political fights for power. As a 
result of these campaigns, different political parties gained power at each 
subsequent election. When one government initiated laws the next government 
almost immediately overwrote them. This resulted in legal instability and created 
financial losses. The current government’s intention to create new laws in every 
segment of the state - including the constitution - does not help the democratic 
transition (even if the intention is good). The new laws have many shortcomings, 
and the government party, which controls more than two-thirds of the 
parliament’s seats, can easily initiate changes. The civil organisations, including 
the TI, are only formally involved in the democratisation process. There were 
unfortunate examples recently when the government attacked NGOs and stopped 
them functioning legally (e.g. the case of the Norwegian Fund
15
). There are 
continually attempts from the civil sphere to make things better. For example the 
Hungarian Resident Association suggested that doctors who promise not to accept 
gratitude payments, and wear a green badge to signal this to patients, should get 
higher salaries (Népszabadság, 7 January 2011) - without result. Citizens are 
getting more and more conscious about the fact that the democratic transition 
should come from the society, and not be pressured by the law. The wide-spread 
demonstration against some new laws and taxes, the popularity of political blogs, 
TV channels and radio programs are sign that the people are thinking 
democratically. There is a whole blog-culture, where people debate current 
political issues, corruption cases and civil rights. The leaders of civil social 
organisations believe - as Miklos Ligeti pointed out - that the Hungarian people 
are not morally inferior to the western EU citizens. The democratic transition is 
still happening - it did not end with the EU accession.  
  
                                                          
15
 http://hungarianspectrum.org/2015/05/30/the-war-between-the-hungarian-government-
and-the-ngos-continues/ 
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Appendix 
Appendix I 
The forms of governments  
 
arrival to the Carpathian Basin - 895- tribal confederation 
895-1000 Principality 
1000-1438 Patrimonial Monarchy- Kingdom 
1438-1848 Feudal Monarchy 
(1541-1699 Ottoman Hungary) 
1848-1918 Constitutional Monarchy 
1918-1919 I. Hungarian (People’s)Republic 
1919 Proletarian Dictatorship 
1920-1946 Kingdom (without a king) 
1946-1949 II. Hungarian Republic 
1949-1989 Communist Dictatorship (People’s Republic) 
1989- III. Hungarian Republic 
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Appendix II 
   Faculty of Social Science 
   Sociology of Law 
Department  
 
 
 Participant Information Sheet 
 
Study title and Researcher Details: 
 
Title: Exploring the reasons behind the persistent low-level corruption in Hungary 
through the practice of the European Union-wide regulated institution of whistleblowing  
 
Researcher: Fanni Gyurko                                             Supervisor: Dr. Rustamjon Urinboyev 
e-mail: gyurkofanni@gmail.com                                 e-mail: 
rustamjon.urinboyev@soclaw.lu.se 
Phone: +36202107385                                                   Phone: 046-222 37 99 
 
Master Thesis in SELA (Master of Science Programme in Sociology of European Law (120 
credits)) 
http://www.soclaw.lu.se/en/education/masters-programme/about-the-masters-
programme-sela 
Invitation paragraph   
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide it is important 
for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please 
take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you 
wish. Please ask if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more 
information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
Thank you for reading this.  
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What is the purpose of the study 
The low-level or everyday corruption is a form of corruption which appears between the 
citizens and low-level official, and during which sometimes is difficult to decide that the 
motivation of the informal transaction is friendship or private gain. In most cases the two 
comes together and it is difficult to distinguish. This dual situation was widespread in the 
post-communist countries, and it didn’t stop after the system transition and he EU 
accession. This informal economic transaction is part of everyday life. The actors don’t 
think about that what they do is illegal, they refer to it as a part of the survival strategy. 
Sometimes the complexity of the laws and inadequate legislation provide a situation 
when the logical step is initiating an informal transaction. In this research I will examine 
the possible explanation of the persistency of low-level corruption from the view point of 
those citizens who can abuse state property or power for their private gain, because of 
their position in the organisation. These employees are everyday relationship with 
citizens and from their position it is difficult to separate the corruption from private 
informal transactions.  
 
What will happen if I take part? 
It depends on you and only you that you want to take part in the research or not. Even if 
you decide that you take part, you can resign anytime without stating any reason. It will 
be an informal interview, which can take between 30 minutes or 1 hour 30 minutes. 
During the talk I won’t use any audio or picture recording. 
I attached the guiding questions, what you can expect. 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
Please note that assurances on confidentiality will be strictly adhered. You will get a 
number to register, I won’t use your name, address or any personal data, you won’t be 
recognisable. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The result of the study will be my master thesis, which will be approximately 60 pages/ 
20.000 words. It is possible that shorter article will be produced from the collected 
material and the results of the master thesis, which will be published. I will use the 
collected material for my PhD thesis as well. 
 
Ethical Statement: 
I, Fanni Gyurko state that I won’t use and abuse any personal data. The collected 
material will be handled in a secured way, the participants won’t be recognisable in any 
ways. 
 
                                                                                                                  Fanni Gyurko 
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Appendix III 
 
Unstructured interview questions and the process of the interview: 
1. In the beginning of the interview: 
I explain my research topic and make sure that the interviewee understands that 
we will talk about corruption, which includes questions about illegal and immoral 
practices. I will explain the ethical issues around the interview and I will also give 
them a written copy of the ethics, which they can examine before the interview. 
2. General questions: 
1. What do you think generally about the corruption in Hungary? 
1 a Do you think that is there any change in the situation of petty corruption since 
the democratic transition (1987)? 
1 b Do you think that there is any change in the situation of petty corruption since 
the EU accession ( 2004)?   
2. How common or widespread is corruption in your opinion? why do you use 
informal means? 
3. What are the typical excuses or explanations for corruption? 
4. How does corruption influence your life? 
5. Who could initiate a corrupt transaction in your organisation and in what 
situation? 
5 a Are there rules, codes rituals or routines in this transactions? 
3. Specific questions: 
6 Have you ever participated in corruption, illegal means, coping startegies? 
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7 Have you ever used the organisation’s resources or your power (which comes 
from your position) for private gain or resources exchange? 
8 Do you know someone else in your organisation who have used the 
organisation’s resources or his /her power for private gain or resources exchange? 
8 a How did you regard this act? ( positive-negative- necessary) 
8 b Did you consider this act as corrupt? 
8 c How would you define corruption with your own words? 
8 d Could you define the border-line between an informal transaction and an 
illegal corrupt act?  
Boundary between gift and bribes? in whih case do you think  it became? gray 
zone? voluntary and mandatory 
9 Do you know about any wrong-doings in your organisation, which could be 
reported under the protection of the whistle blowing act? 
9 a Have you reported it in any official forum or ways? 
9 b Have you considered any informal way to stand against the wrong-doing? 
9 c Why do you remain silent about it? 
10. When would you report a corrupt act? 
10 a Is there any situation why you would report a corrupt act? 
10 b Is there any time when you would report a corrupt act? 
10 c Does your decision about reporting depend on you position and the corrupt 
actor position in the organisation?  
11 Do you feel secure and protected in case you would report a wrong-doing? 
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Appendix IV 
 
categories 
(post -
communist 
Hungary) 
Petty corruption 
1. 
imperatives 
in informal 
resource 
exchange 
(Jancsics, 
2014) 
macro-level imperatives organisational-level imperatives ‘Living law‘ 
imperatives 
universalistic 
norms 
material structural 
imperatives 
pluralistic 
norms 
material hierarchical 
imperatives 
1. wrong 
regulations 
2.’just go with the 
flow’ 
3. ‘I do it because 
I am pressured by 
the institute or by 
my superior’ 
consume 
more 
‘Robin 
Hood 
attitude’ 
‘I 
cannot 
afford 
to not 
violate 
rules’ 
dysfunctional 
post socialist 
institutions 
Don’t 
turn on 
an in-
group 
mate 
gatekeepers ordered 
to be 
corrupt 
2.  
relationship 
between the 
client and 
the corrupt 
actor 
(Jancsics, 
2013) 
the client and actor do not have a prior 
relationship - external factors dominate 
cases with stronger social ties 
between actors and client - more 
freedom to structure the 
relationship 
 
4.  
brokerage 
in low-level 
corruption, 
3
rd
 actor 
(Jancsics, 
2013) 
1. representative 
2. entrepreneur 
3. gatekeeper 
4. extra service 
5. multiple inside brokerage 
 
5. The 
participants’ 
social status 
(based on 
their 
education 
and 
occupation) 
1. elite 
2. middle class 
3. entrepreneur 
4. working class (no-college degree, manual workers, low-level administrative) 
5. lower working class 
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(Jancsics, 
2014) 
The actor’s 
perception 
of the 
corrupt act: 
positive negative necessary 
If people do 
report or 
speak up 
against 
corruption, 
in what 
form are 
they doing 
that? 
formally informally 
 
 
